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UNTANGLING COMPETING
CONCEPTIONS OF "EVIDENCE"
Scott W. Howe*
I. INTRODUCrION
In law there is no single conception of "evidence." I do not
mean merely that we disagree about how to refine a vague-but
shared-view of evidence. I mean that we lack a single under-
standing of evidence as a basic idea. Evidence conveys fundamen-
tally different notions at once.
* Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law, Orange County, Cali-
fornia; A.B., 1977, University of Missouri; J.D., 1981, University of Michigan.
I am indebted to Andrea Bierstein, Gabriel J. Chin, Arthur B. Leavens,
Barry J. Stern, and Samuel Stonefield for incisive critiques of previous drafts. Most
importantly, I thank Jetty Maria Howe for assistance and encouragement at all
stages of the project.
1. The view frequently emerges that trial results should reflect the evidence, which
suggests the need for attention to what evidence means. See, e.g., United States v.
Keiswetter, 860 F.2d 992, 996 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc); see also Anjili Soni & Michael
E. McCann, Twenty-Fifth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: II. Preliminary Pro-
ceedings, 84 GEO. LI. 887, 1061 n.1406 (1996) (citing appellate decisions reviewing
whether evidence provided an adequate factual basis for trial court results); Diana
Garcia, Comment, Remittitur in Environmental Cases: Developing a Standard of Re-
view for Federal Courts, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AF1. L. REV. 119, 133 (1988) (stating that an
award after remittitur should reflect the maximum possible recovery supported by the
evidence). Model jury charges used in various federal courts include an instruction di-
recting jurors to decide the case before them based on the evidence. See infra note 89.
Appellate courts also commonly assert that the results in trials should generally repre-
sent a good faith effort by the trier to reach a verdict consistent with the evidence. See,
e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961) (striking down a conviction on grounds of
prejudicial pretrial publicity and noting that the test of individual impartiality for pro-
spective jurors who have been exposed to news about the case is whether "the juror can
lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence pre-
sented in court"), quoted with approval in Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800 (1975).
This assertion deserves some qualification. We allow jurors in criminal cases to acquit
defendants who appear guilty though we do not advise jurors of this "nullification"
power. See Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Con-
troversy, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 52-56 (1980). Also, some questions presented
to jurors turn on value judgments to a greater extent than others. See Scott W. Howe,
Juror Neutrality or an Impartiality Array? A Structural Theory of the Impartial Jury
Mandate, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1173, 1182 (1995). Examples of situations calling
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Lawyers normally speak of evidence in relation to certain
kinds of sources from which information emanates.2 Further, law-
yers are accustomed to thinking of the sources of evidence as nar-
rowly circumscribed. Typically, lawyers view evidence as coming
from only four places: (1) the assertions of witnesses testifying un-
der oath; (2) exhibits introduced by the parties; (3) stipulations be-
tween the parties; and (4) statements of judicial notice by the trial
judge. Other factors may also legitimately influence the fact
finder. However, under this "four-sources" conception,4 these ad-
ditional inputs do not constitute evidence.
At the same time some lawyers contend that evidence encom-
for triers to express openly their value judgments include capital sentencing and ob-
scenity prosecutions. See generally Scott W. Howe, Reassessing the Individualization
Mandate in Capital Sentencing: Darrow's Defense of Leopold and Loeb, 79 IowA L.
REv. 989 (1994) (noting the uncertainty that any societal view exists about how to as-
sess the blame due a capital offender); Stanton D. Krauss, Representing the Community:
A Look at the Selection Process in Obscenity Cases and Capital Sentencing, 64 IND. L.J.
617, 624 (1989) (noting the trier's judgment decision in determining if a work should be
condemned due to its "prurient appeal" and its "patent offensiveness"). Apart from
these qualifications, the idea survives that trial verdicts should reflect the evidence. See,
e.g., Keiswetter, 860 F.2d at 996.
2. Lawyers also sometimes use the term "evidence" in relation to a set of proce-
dural rules-certain laws governing the conduct of hearings. However, my focus here is
on how lawyers think of the inputs themselves.
3. This view of what constitutes evidence is demonstrated most clearly by the
model instructions promulgated by various United States circuit courts for use in fed-
eral trials. See infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
4. With the term "four-sources conception," I mean to include definitions of evi-
dence that are even more restrictive than the conception represented in the text as well
as those that are slightly more expansive. Some dispute exists around the fringes of the
restrictive conception of legal evidence. For example, some contend that judicially no-
ticed facts do not involve the presentation of evidence but rather exemplify facts estab-
lished in lieu of evidence. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRK-
PATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES 837 (3d ed. 1996) ("Judicial notice of
adjudicative facts ... serves as a substitute for evidence."). The same kind of argument
could be made for statements regarding factual stipulations between the parties. See,
e.g., April Anstett, California Supreme Court Survey: February 1994-December 1994,
22 PEPP. L. REV. 1675, 1688 (1995); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence Law Visits Ju-
rassic Park- The Far-Reaching Implication of the Daubert Court's Recognition of the
Uncertainty of the Scientific Enterprise, 81 IowA L. REV. 55, 71 (1995). Likewise, some
have argued that a jury view of a scene outside the courtroom is in the nature of real
evidence although others claim that it is only an aid to understanding the evidence. See,
e.g., JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 132 (8th ed.
1988) (noting that authorities are divided on this question). In the opposite direction,
some dispute exists over whether witness demeanor should be viewed as evidence and,
if so, to what extent. See infra note 15 and accompanying text. These disagreements
around the margins of the restrictive conception do not undermine my central point
that lawyers often tend to conceive of legal evidence as encompassing only a fraction of
the sources of information legitimately relied upon by the fact finder.
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passes everything that legitimately influences the fact finder.5
Some scholars contend that evidence, in general parlance, includes
any legitimate grounds for a belief, anything that tends to prove or
disprove a proposition.6 Under this view, legal evidence is much
broader than the restrictive four-sources conception. For example,
fact finders can legitimately rely on witness demeanor, facts
learned through a formal view of an event scene, and knowledge
that they possess before the beginning of the trial. Also, the ques-
tions and arguments of counsel, the demeanor of the parties, and
the legal instructions applicable to the case often provide informa-
tion that fact finders legitimately consider in reaching factual con-
clusions. Under a more expansive conception, a wide variety of
sources provide evidence.
The failure to recognize the existence of these different con-
ceptions of evidence poses problems. Lawyers often confuse these
two ideas when they refer to the evidence in a case. Lawyers fre-
quently think of the four-sources conception as defining what
qualifies as evidence. Yet, they also often erroneously think that
the evidence-as defined by the four-sources conception-
encompasses everything that legitimately influences the fact
finder. Thus, the four-sources conception comes to define, incor-
rectly, the legitimate aspects of proof.
This tendency to muddle the two different conceptions of evi-
dence infects broad segments of legal discourse and carries signifi-
cant consequences. The confusion invades how legal academics
5. See, eg., sources cited infra note 101.
6. See, e.g., 1 JAMES M. HENDERSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
IN CIVIL CASES 3 (1926) (noting that in ordinary usage "'evidence' is understood to be
anything that makes evident or clear to the mind, or such things collectively; any
ground or reason for knowledge or certitude in knowledge; proof whether from imme-
diate knowledge or from thought, authority or testimony; a fact or body of facts on
which a proof, belief or judgment is based; that which shows or indicates"); Morris D.
Forkosch, The Nature of Legal Evidence, 59 CAL. L. REV. 1356, 1357 (1971) (noting
that, in nonlegal contexts, any item, including merely a view or belief, may be evidence
of a proposition "so long as those who consider the item feel that it is worthy of being
appraised and evaluated").
Professor Thayer asserted long ago that differences exist between legal afid
nonlegal discourse over the idea of evidence. For example, he declared that evidence
in the legal context, unlike in other social contexts, does not include preexisting knowl-
edge of the fact finder relevant to its resolution of a factual question. See JAMES
BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW
264 (1898). For more on Thayer's view, see infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
While this more all-encompassing conception of evidence may find its source in
general parlance, it also has influenced legal discourse about evidence. See infra text
accompanying notes 96-149.
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teach evidence, how lawyers litigate cases, and how judges instruct
juries and respond to a variety of alleged trial errors. The confu-
sion and its deleterious effects warrant reexamination of how we
conceive of evidence, which is the central function of this Article.
This Article proceeds in five stages. Part II demonstrates that
triers of fact legitimately find facts based heavily on information
that does not qualify as evidence under the four-sources concep-
tion. I participated as a lawyer in a criminal trial that illustrates
this point. Although this account dramatically underscores that
the legitimate influences on fact finders extend well beyond the
four-sources definition of evidence, the same point applies in all
juridical, fact finding contexts.
The Article then focuses on the conflation problem that
muddles our thinking about the proof process. Part III shows that
the four-sources conception has come to dominate lawyers' view of
evidence. Part IV then demonstrates that lawyers sometimes tend
to understand evidence as encompassing all that permissibly influ-
ences a trier's factual findings. As part of this discussion, this Ar-
ticle discusses how lawyers often confuse the first conception with
the second by concluding that evidence includes only information
within the four-sources conception and that these inputs encom-
pass all that legitimately influences the fact finder. This Article
also illuminates the ill effects in various legal contexts of this im-
proper intermingling of the separate conceptions of evidence.
Part V turns to the question of remedy. I address whether, if
we could reinvent our discourse, we would best define legal evi-
dence according to the four-sources conception or, instead, as all
of the informational inputs legitimately influencing the fact finder.
While arguing that we would best choose the broad conception of
evidence over the four-sources conception if we could choose be-
tween them, this Article ultimately concludes that we cannot ex-
pect to secure any consensus about the meaning of legal evidence.
Based on our inability to agree on a single conception, lawyers
must simply acknowledge the dual conceptions and strive to avoid
muddling them.
Part VI underscores the benefits to be achieved from untan-
gling our dual conceptions of evidence. Keeping the two concep-
tions separate does not lead to easy answers about what informa-
tion a fact finder should consider or what information an appellate
court reviewing the rationality of a verdict legitimately will em-
ploy. This Article's aim is not to define the boundaries of legiti-
[Vol. 30:1199
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mate proof, but is to demonstrate the more basic point that avoid-
ing confusion of the dual conceptions of evidence removes an im-
portant obstacle to rational thinking concerning the boundaries of
legitimate proof. The conceptual confusion leads to the erroneous
conclusion that legal fact finders, in every context, appropriately
weigh only information embodied by the four-sources. By ac-
knowledging that the four-sources conception does not define le-
gitimate proof, lawyers force themselves to recognize that fact
finding will and, indeed, should encompass a broad sphere of in-
fluences. Further, lawyers must justify the boundaries of legiti-
mate proof other than by merely citing this restrictive view of evi-
dence.
II. A JURY'S FACTUAL FINDINGS IN A ONE-WITNESS TRIAL
Many years ago, while a lawyer with the Public Defender
Service (PDS) in Washington, D.C., another PDS lawyer and I de-
fended a nineteen-year-old man named Robert Dixon (Dixon).
Our experience in the Dixon case vividly demonstrates that much
of the information that legitimately persuades jurors to reach fac-
tual conclusions does not fall within the four-sources conception of
evidence. Although this case underscores the message in a striking
way, the same point applies in various degrees to virtually all tri-
als.7
The indictment charged our client and an eighteen-year-old
codefendant, Bryan Dobbs (Dobbs), with armed robbery and as-
sault with intent to kill. The victim, Vernon Vinson (Vinson), was
a man in his early twenties. On an evening in late June, Dixon and
Dobbs allegedly stabbed Vinson in the neck with a knife and
robbed him of one hundred dollars.
A police detective provided information at the preliminary
hearing that revealed more details of Vinson's account. Vinson
had known the defendants for many years, as they all had grown
up on Capitol Hill where Vinson still lived. On the evening of the
incident, Vinson ran into Dixon and Dobbs at the home of a mu-
tual friend who lived near Vinson. The codefendant, Dobbs, asked
Vinson if Vinson could give Dixon and Dobbs a ride to northwest
Washington. Vinson agreed, but first drove to his own home and
went inside to obtain something. He alleged that, moments after
7. In telling the story of the investigation and the trial, I have changed the names
and some of the facts to safeguard privacy interests.
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he reentered the car, he was attacked and robbed. According to
detectives who interviewed Vinson in the hospital, the codefen-
dant, Dobbs, stabbed Vinson in the side of the neck from behind.
Simultaneously, our client, Dixon, snatched a one hundred dollar
bill from Vinson's right pants pocket. When Dixon and Dobbs
fled, Vinson drove away, attempting to gain assistance. A police
officer pulled him over for reckless driving about three miles north
of the scene of the stabbing. Upon seeing Vinson's condition, the
officer called an ambulance. The ambulance transported Vinson
to the nearby Washington Hospital Center, which admitted and
treated him.
Vinson's account did not ring true. First, a police report indi-
cated that Vinson told the officer who stopped him, "Six guys
jumped me and robbed me as I was walking from my car to my
house." The conflicting statement suggested that Vinson was try-
ing to cover up something. That Vinson drove so far from the
scene of the incident to obtain help was also peculiar. Although he
was stopped only a few blocks from the Washington Hospital Cen-
ter, there were two hospitals in the immediate vicinity of the stab-
bing. His failure to seek help at those facilities could suggest that
he was trying to avoid the authorities.
We hypothesized that Vinson was stabbed in a drug deal gone
sour. In addition to Vinson's possible efforts to cover up, we
learned that he had previously been arrested for drug dealing. Al-
though only convicted for marijuana possession, Vinson had been
arrested for selling heroin.' He originally received probation for
this offense, but a judge revoked his probation several months af-
ter the stabbing because Vinson tested positive several times for
cocaine consumption. We also found a woman named Wanda
Winters, who lived near Vinson, and who told us that she saw Vin-
son dealing drugs in the neighborhood on several occasions. She
also told us she was in the car with Vinson and both defendants on
the night of the incident and had witnessed the codefendant,
Dobbs, buy from Vinson a fairly large amount of marijuana sup-
posedly laced with phencyclidine. 9 She left the car, however, be-
8. Police saw Vinson selling drugs in front of a high school. When arrested, Vin-
son had six small bags of heroin and several ounces of marijuana in his pocket. Based
on a lenient bargain, he later pled guilty to marijuana possession, and the heroin
charges were abandoned.
9. She was in the car because she was a friend of all three men. It was clear from
informal comments made by the prosecutor, however, that he planned to try to dis-
credit her on grounds that she had been romantically involved with our client, Dixon.
[Vol. 30:1199
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fore the stabbing.
We also located Theresa Gibbons (Gibbons), the common law
wife of Vinson, who gave us helpful information. She said that on
the day of the stabbing, Vinson dropped her off at the Washington
Hospital Center because she was suffering complications in the
late stages of pregnancy. She had given Vinson five hundred dol-
lars in cash that afternoon with instructions to take it to her aunt,
Wilhelmina Wilson, who was going to make the deposit on a new
apartment for them. Gibbons next heard from Vinson the follow-
ing morning on the telephone. To her surprise, Vinson told her he
was at the same hospital and not simply as a visitor. He told her
he had been stabbed and was admitted as a patient. Gibbons was
allowed to visit Vinson a few minutes later. During the visit Vin-
son told Gibbons that, after the stabbing, he drove to the home of
Gibbons's aunt, Ms. Wilson, because she was a nurse and could
treat him. However, when he showed up at her door in the middle
of the night, she told him to go directly to the hospital. Gibbons
told us that Ms. Wilson lived about two miles north of the street
where Vinson was stopped by the police officer. Thus, it became
clear that Vinson passed the Washington Hospital Center driving
away from the stabbing and was stopped while driving south to-
ward the scene of the stabbing rather than north away from it.
Gibbons said she asked Vinson if he had given the money for
the apartment to her aunt. He told Gibbons that he had but that
some of the money was "missing." He also told her that police de-
tectives were coming to visit him shortly. Gibbons admitted hav-
ing been furious with Vinson for losing part of the deposit money.
She told us that she said to Vinson: "You better tell them some-
thing good because I want that missing money back."
The investigator and I then located Ms. Wilson. She was very
cooperative and her story coincided with Gibbons's. She told us
that, on the night of the incident, Vinson pounded on her front
door at about 1:00 a.m. She got out of bed and opened the front
door. She found Vinson bleeding profusely at the neck. She also
noticed several bills protruding from his right pants pocket. She
asked him what happened. Vinson said: "Two guys tricked me
into an alley and stabbed and robbed me." She pulled the money
from his pocket, which turned out to be two one hundred dollar
bills. She looked at his neck and told him that he should go im-
mediately to the nearby Washington Hospital Center. Vinson
then ran to his car and drove away.
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Our theory was becoming more detailed. We hypothesized
that Vinson used three hundred dollars of the deposit money from
Gibbons to purchase drugs. He then attempted to sell the drugs
for a profit. He sold one hundred dollars worth of drugs to the co-
defendant, Dobbs, but Dobbs was dissatisfied. The argument and
stabbing occurred when Vinson refused to return Dobbs's money.
Dobbs stabbed Vinson to get back his money and, indeed, took
back only one hundred dollars. Vinson hid or disposed of the re-
maining drugs shortly after the stabbing. Most important, our cli-
ent, Dixon, was innocently present during the events. He was only
trying to secure a ride to northwest Washington. Moreover, Vin-
son obviously had reason to lie about the incident and to falsely
implicate our client. Vinson knew Dixon was a witness to what ac-
tually occurred and, to put Dixon on the defensive, Vinson alleged
that Dixon assisted Dobbs with the purported robbery and stab-
bing.
At the trial the jurors fully adopted our factual hypothesis al-
though they heard little evidence, as conventionally conceived, to
support it. In opening statements I outlined our theory that the
codefendant, Dobbs, alone had stabbed Vinson in a dispute over a
drug transaction. I emphasized Vinson's effort to obtain help from
his girlfriend's aunt rather than the authorities and his inconsistent
statements to the first police officer and the aunt.10 I asserted that
jurors would conclude that our client, Dixon, was innocently at the
scene of the stabbing.
Unexpectedly, Vinson was the only witness who testified at
the trial. The prosecutor spent about fifteen minutes bringing out
Vinson's story of being stabbed during a robbery. The prosecutor
also brought out Vinson's prior conviction for drug possession to
take the sting out of our anticipated impeachment of him. How-
ever, Vinson did not mention that, before being pulled over by the
police, he had gone to the house of his girlfriend's aunt, where she
had taken two hundred dollars that was hanging from his pocket,
or that he had given inconsistent statements about the stabbing."
10. The prosecutor's opening only outlined a bare bones story that coincided with
the account Vinson had given the detectives. Dobbs's lawyer, who spoke after me,
simply encouraged the jurors to wait until the end of the trial before reaching any fac-
tual conclusions.
11. We asked ourselves why the prosecutor had not brought out Vinson's visit to
Ms. Wilson's house that night. We suspected that the prosecutor did not know about
the visit. No mention of the visit appeared in Vinson's grand jury testimony. Because
the judge ordered us to proceed immediately with the first witness after the opening,
[Vol. 30:1199
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My colleague's cross-examination of Vinson made him look
foolish . She secured Vinson's concession that he had driven to
Ms. Wilson's house. When she noted that he did not tell the grand
jury about this, he said, implausibly, that he forgot about those
events until that moment. He also admitted that he passed three
hospitals on his route away from the scene of the stabbing. My
colleague then asked if he drove to Ms. Wilson's house because he
wanted to avoid an inquiry by the authorities. Vinson denied this
contention but offered no better explanation. His demeanor
throughout the cross-examination also undermined his credibility.
He frequently offered halting responses as if he were thinking
about the best answer rather than simply reciting the truth. Fur-
ther, he did not deny the accusations leveled against him with
much emphasis.
My colleague also elicited from Vinson details about the pur-
ported robbery that made Vinson's account appear improbable.
First, she asked Vinson if his girlfriend gave him five hundred
dollars to deliver to her aunt. Vinson denied this but later admit-
ted it. Vinson later conceded that the money was in his pocket
throughout the evening and ultimately was taken by Ms. Wilson,
who saw it hanging from his pocket. Vinson first denied that any
of the money was missing and then suggested that some of it may
have been missing because he did not know how much money Ms.
Wilson pulled from his pocket. However, my colleague asked
rhetorically, "So you're telling the jury that someone robbed you
of one hundred dollars, but left several hundred dollars hanging
from your pocket?" Vinson asserted that this was true.
My colleague also sought to show that Vinson bought drugs
that he then sold to the codefendant, Dobbs. However, little evi-
dence-as conventionally conceived-supported these proposi-
tions. First, she asked Vinson if he had dealt drugs in the neigh-
borhood for several years. Vinson denied it. She then asked if
Vinson was arrested for selling heroin in front of a high school two
years earlier. The prosecutor objected, but the judge allowed the
question. Vinson admitted that he was arrested for heroin distri-
the prosecutor also had no opportunity to speak with Vinson between the openings and
when Vinson took the stand.
12. Theresa Gibbons told us that the prosecutor made this comment. The conver-
sation with Gibbons occurred outside the courthouse at the end of the day on which
Vinson testified. I happened to see Gibbons entering the subway station and greeted
her. She angrily said that she was not talking to me because the prosecutor told her we
used what we learned from her to make Vinson look "like a fool."
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bution but denied that he had been selling; he claimed that the
several bags of heroin found on his person were for his own con-
sumption. My colleague then asked Vinson to agree that he
bought drugs with his girlfriend's money on the night of the inci-
dent and sold some to Dobbs. Vinson denied it. She then asked
Vinson to agree that the stabbing stemmed from a dispute over the
drugs Vinson sold Dobbs. Vinson again denied her allegation.
My colleague also focused on showing that Vinson had given
inconsistent statements about the stabbing and that his girlfriend
was furious at him for losing part of her money. In leading fash-
ion, she asked Vinson about the statements we learned he made to
the aunt and to the first police officer. She also asked Vinson to
affirm our information as to his conversation with his girlfriend at
the hospital. Vinson denied that any of the statements were
made. 3
When the trial continued the next morning, the prosecutor
surprised us by announcing that the government would rest with-
out calling any more witnesses. We decided that the jury would
acquit our client, Dixon, at that point, so we rested without calling
any of our witnesses. The codefendant, Dobbs, also rested.
Hence, the judge announced that we would discuss instructions
and move to the summations.
In her closing argument my colleague argued that Vinson was
obviously deceitful, and she posed suggestive questions about what
actually happened while also urging that Dixon was only inno-
cently present. "Why was Vinson telling a lie if not to cover up
something?" she asked. After recounting some of what Vinson
admitted, she asked, rhetorically, "Isn't it likely that, since the
person left money hanging from Vinson's pocket, he was only try-
ing to get back what was rightfully his?" She also emphasized the
undisputed testimony that Dobbs, not Dixon, stabbed Vinson. Al-
though Vinson claimed that Dixon took his money, my colleague
asserted that Dixon had nothing to do with it. She explained that
Vinson would benefit from implicating Dixon because that tactic
would put Dixon on the defensive, thus neutralizing him as a wit-
ness who could give a disinterested account of what actually hap-
13. Counsel for the codefendant cross-examined Vinson for an additional fifteen
minutes, underscoring points that already were made in the first cross-examination.
The prosecutor asked Vinson only a few perfunctory questions on redirect, Vinson was
excused, and the proceedings ended for the day.
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pened.14
The jurors fully accepted our factual theory. They acquitted
both defendants of the robbery charges. They also acquitted our
client of assault with intent to kill. However, they convicted
Dobbs of that allegation. These verdicts coincided with our theory
but not with most of the story given by Vinson. Moreover, in con-
versation with some of the jurors after the trial, they told us that
they found the facts to be as we had hypothesized. One of the ju-
rors pointed out, incidentally, that Vinson followed a route after
the stabbing that took him near a police station where he could
have reported the robbery and received help if he were not trying
to avoid the authorities. This point was not mentioned in the tes-
timony.
How much evidence, as defined by the four-sources concep-
tion, supported our factual theory? Very little. Vinson admitted
that a substantial amount of money was left hanging from his
pocket when he was assaulted, and he conceded that he drove sev-
eral miles to the home of his girlfriend's aunt while passing up
chances to stop at hospitals with which he was familiar. He also
admitted he was convicted of marijuana possession for an incident
in which he possessed both marijuana and heroin. Yet, little other
evidence, as defined by the four-sources conception, supported the
jury's factual conclusions.
The jurors legitimately considered other information to reach
the conclusion that the altercation was a drug deal gone sour. The
jurors appropriately considered their assessment of the motiva-
tions of typical robbers to conclude that Vinson's account of rob-
bers taking only a small portion of his money was highly implausi-
ble. Their sense of these motivations was not evidence under the
four-sources conception. Yet, the jurors properly considered their
own knowledge on this question. The jurors also appropriately re-
lied on Vinson's demeanor on the stand measured against their
expectations of the typical, innocent victim of a near-fatal robbery.
This information was not evidence under the four-sources defini-
14. Dobbs's lawyer argued, in essence, that Vinson's story was incredible and,
therefore, doubt existed that any of the elements of either of the charges were estab-
lished with respect to Dobbs.
The prosecutor argued that Vinson's story was basically true even if some of his
testimony was troublesome. The prosecutor also argued that we failed to prove some
of the statements about which we had asked Vinson and that this was an indication of
the actual weakness of our attack on Vinson's credibility.
April 1997]
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tion, though there is no dispute that the jurors could consider it. 5
Furthermore, the conclusion that all of this information suggested
that Viiison lied was not simply a reason to doubt Vinson's ac-
count. Considered with his effort to implicate the defendants, the
jurors concluded, based on their own experiences in the world, that
Vinson's lying implied more-that he was trying to cover up his
own wrongdoing. Again, the knowledge underlying this inference
was not evidence, but it was surely appropriately considered. The
conclusion that Vinson was hiding hii own wrongdoing in turn led
to the proper interpretation of Vinson's failure to pursue oppor-
tunities for help at public facilities; he was trying to avoid the
authorities. In reaching this conclusion the jurors also considered
Vinson's failure to stop at a nearby police station. Although that
fact was not mentioned in the testimony, the jurors appropriately
relied on this kind of indisputable information gained from living
in the community. What, however, was Vinson trying to cover up?
Though it seems doubtful, perhaps our jurors inferred the an-
swer simply from hearing Vinson's direct examination and his in-
consistent statements on cross-examination. In any event, my
opening statement and my colleague's questions suggested a hy-
pothesis of a drug transaction gone sour between Vinson and
Dobbs. The jurors evaluated this hypothesis against their own
idea of what occurs on the streets of Washington and decided that
it was more likely than any other hypothesis. They were not rely-
ing on evidence under the four-sources view in formulating and as-
senting to the hypothesis suggested in our opening statement, our
questions, and our closing argument. Yet it was indisputably
proper for them to consider and assent to it.
Furthermore, could jurors appropriately conclude that our cli-
ent was uninvolved in the stabbing? Vinson's prevarications about
other details as well as the perceivable benefit to him of falsely
implicating Dixon supported the view that Vinson lied in claiming
that our client took his money or otherwise manifested his assent
to the stabbing. In considering Vinson's dishonesty regarding
other events and in evaluating its meaning based on their own ex-
15. The well-accepted view is that this information can be considered to decide
whether the witness's testimony is credible but not as substantive evidence of a coun-
tervailing hypothesis. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Demeanor Impeachment: Law
and Tactics, 9 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 183, 192 (1985). However, we frequently do not
classify this information as evidence even when conceding that it is properly used to
decide whether to credit the witness. See infra text accompanying note 86 (detailing a
representative jury instruction used in federal court).
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periences with humans, the jurors were not relying on evidence as
conceived under the four-sources view. Likewise, in adopting our
proposed hypothesis of Vinson's motivations for falsely implicat-
ing Dixon and in using their own experiences to analyze it, the ju-
rors were not relying on evidence under the four-sources concep-
tion. Nonetheless, the jurors were surely entitled to consider all of
this information in deciding whether our client was an accessory.
The Dixon case, though not extraordinary, 6 demonstrates
with unusual clarity that triers legitimately find facts based on in-
formation that does not qualify as evidence under the four-sources
conception. 7 This account has not extracted the limits of informa-
16. The same general point could be made in the context of a well-known trial.
Consider the good-faith disagreements that arose over the accuracy of the Simpson
verdict. See, e.g., Martin Gottlieb, Racial Split at the End, as at the Start N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 4, 1995, at Al ("Separated by a constant gap of about 40 percentage points, many
whites seemed to hold fast to the belief that Mr. Simpson was guilty, while blacks be-
lieved as adamantly in his innocence."); Richard Morin, Poll Reflects Division over
Simpson Case, WASH. PosT, Oct. 8,1995, at A31 (noting that 8 of 10 blacks interviewed
said they agreed with the decision, including 66% who said they strongly approved,
while 55% of all whites interviewed said they disapproved of the jury's decision, includ-
ing 40% who expressed strong disapproval; further, 7 of 10 blacks expressed confidence
that Simpson had not killed the victims while an equal proportion of whites expressed
the opposite belief). The Simpson verdict underscored that fact finders rely heavily on
background information that they bring with them to the trial. Obviously, some ob-
servers might have reached different conclusions than others because they did not see
the same portions of the trial. However, good-faith differences of opinion about the
accuracy of the verdict also must have existed among persons witnessing essentially the
same trial proceedings. An explanation for these differing conclusions is that observers
doubting Simpson's guilt relied on different funds of experiential knowledge to analyze
the testimony and exhibits than those observers who thought Simpson guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. As Professor Burt Neuborne has noted, a person's construction of
reality is necessarily built on experiential background. See Burt Neuborne, Of Sausage
Factories and Syllogism Machines: Formalism, Realism, and Exclusionary Selection
Techniques, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 419,443 (1992). Hence, influences outside of the four-
sources conception of evidence necessarily affect to a significant degree one's view of
the facts.
17. Input falling outside the conventional four-sources view may also cause jurors
to accept a view consistent with guilt rather than innocence. As noted, the jurors in the
Dixon case ultimately convicted the codefendant, Dobbs, of assault with intent to kill
according to a factual view constructed largely from non-four-sources evidence.
Another example of non-four-sources evidence producing a conviction focuses
on Daniel Webster's argument for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in the prose-
cution of John Francis Knapp for murder. See generally Walker Lewis, The Murder of
Captain Joseph White: Salem, Massachusetts, 1830, 54 A.B.A. J. 460 (1968). In that fa-
mous case, Webster convinced a jury that Knapp had acted as a principal in the murder
of a wealthy ship captain in the victim's bedroom although Knapp had been outside at
the time of the murder. See id. Several commentators have concluded that influences
beyond the testimony, particularly Webster's powerful summation, were essential to
obtaining Knapp's conviction. See, e.g., MAURICE G. BAXTER, ONE AND INSEPARABLE:
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tion that the jurors legitimately employed to find the facts in the
case. Other information also might have influenced the jurors,
such as portions of the court's instructions, 18 the contrasting de-
meanor of the two defendants while sitting at the counsel table,19
the demeanor of the judge,20 and other questions containing asser-
DANIEL WEBSTER AND THE UNION 160 (1984) (contending that the effect of Webster's
summation to the jurors was "powerful"); ALLAN L. BENSON, DANIEL WEBSTER 200
(1929) ("[H]e hanged ... [Knapp] by bridging over with powerful oratory yawning gaps
in his evidence."); 1 GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, LIFE OF DANIEL WEBSTER 384 (1870)
("The force of Mr. Webster's argument convinced the jury that Frank [Knapp] was, in
this sense, present at the murder. But the fact was otherwise ... ." (citation omitted)); 2
CLAUDE MOORE FUESS, DANIEL WEBSTER297 (1930) ("Webster... brought to bear all
the influence of his powerful intellect and superb oratory, and, by so doing, ensured the
condemnation of two bloodstained offenders."); John D. Lawson, Preface to Volume
Seven of AMERICAN STATE TRIALS xii (John D. Lawson ed., 1917) ("It was Mr.
Webster's matchless eloquence that won the verdict of guilty as a principal .... );
HENRY CABOT LODGE, DANIEL WEBSTER 195 (9th ed. 1883) (noting that at a meeting
in New York, "He uttered only a few stately platitudes, and yet every one went away
with the firm conviction that they had heard him speak words of the profoundest wis-
dom and grandest eloquency."); Lewis, supra, at 464 (noting that many commentators
credited Webster's advocacy skills as the basis for the guilty verdict).
The record of the Knapp case was preserved and remains widely available
largely because of Webster's prosecutorial efforts. For the record of the trial, see The
Trial of John Francis Knapp for the Murder of Joseph White. Salem, Massachusetts,
1830 in 7 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS 395 (John D. Lawson ed., 1917).
18. A variety of instructions typically given to jurors are intended to affect their
factual findings. In the Dixon case, for example, the judge instructed the jurors not to
draw any inference of guilt from the defendant's failure to testify. As part of this in-
struction, the judge advised jurors that there are a variety of reasons why a defendant
might decide not to testify that would not suggest his criminal guilt. This instruction
would affect the factual conclusions the jurors might otherwise draw from the defen-
dant's failure to take the stand. Trial judges also commonly give cautionary instructions
advising skepticism regarding certain kinds of testimony such as that from children or
witnesses testifying under a plea agreement. Trial judges also commonly give instruc-
tions alerting jurors to permissible inferences endorsed by the law. Examples would
include instructions regarding missing witnesses or inferences to be drawn from a crimi-
nal defendant's possession of recently stolen property. All of these instructions seek to
influence the jurors' factual determinations.
19. The difference in demeanor between the two codefendants favored Dixon who
wore a three-piece suit throughout the proceedings distinguishing him from both Dobbs
and Vinson obviously wearing prisoner garb. Dobbs was serving time on another
charge on which he had been convicted between the time of the alleged crime and the
trial. Vinson was also serving time because his probation had been revoked after the
night of the incident. Dixon also was between us and, throughout the trial, sat erect,
looked attentive, and appeared to take notes of the proceedings. Frequently, he en-
gaged in whispered conversations with us, indicating the rapport we had developed. By
contrast, the codefendant sat slumped in his chair, seemingly half asleep, several feet
from his counsel who rarely spoke to him during the proceedings before the jury.
20. The jurors might not have sensed the judge's opinion of Vinson, but, for me, his
manner conveyed a message of concern. It appeared that the judge studied Vinson
with a furrowed brow as Vinson testified. He also was emphatic in overruling the
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tions that Vinson denied.2' Exploring the boundaries of the fact
finders' legitimate reliance on information not viewed as evidence
under the four-sources conception raises important questions.22 It
is sufficient for purposes of this Article, however, to establish
merely that fact finders legitimately may employ much informa-
tion that does not fall within the four-sources conception of evi-
dence.
III. THE DOMINANCE OF THE FOUR-SOURCES CONCEPTION OF
LEGAL EVIDENCE
More than four-sources information legitimately influences
fact finders, but lawyers usually understand evidence to include
only four-sources material. This limited, source-based conception
of evidence appears most clearly in jury instructions defining evi-
dence.23 The four-sources view is also frequently implicit in how
prosecutor's objection to our inquiry about the details of Vinson's prior arrest on drug
charges. Having been in the judge's courtroom on prior occasions, I recognized this
demeanor as unusual.
21. For example, should jurors have considered questions from defense counsel
that implied that Vinson had made certain contradictory statements? This problem is
more difficult than may initially appear. It is not answered merely by asserting that
lawyers' questions do not themselves provide useful information. As we have already
seen, counsel's questions may provide hypotheses about factual events that we think
jurors are entitled to consider even when the witness denies the hypotheses. It may
seem inappropriate for jurors to have concluded that Vinson probably made the state-
ments based on counsel's questions. However, it is not clearly correct to say that jurors
should not have weighed the questions. What if Vinson, from his demeanor, seemed
dishonest in his denials?
22. Commentary has appeared concerning the proper extent to which jurors rely on
nonevidence under the four-sources conception to reach decisions. See, e.g., SIR
RICHARD EGGLESTON, EVIDENCE, PROOF AND PROBABILrrY 141-45 (2d ed. 1983)
(describing modern English view on limits to appropriate use of background knowl-
edge); Richard M. Fraher, Adjudicative Facts, Non-Evidence Facts, and Permissible Jury
Background Information, 62 IND. L.i. 333, 353 (1987) (criticizing Mansfield's standard
as unworkable and asserting that "it is the particular genius, and not some peculiar
oversight, of the law that has led judges and jurists to look with studied indifference
upon the question of what non-evidence facts the jurors may bring to court with
them"); Saul M. Kassin, The American Jury: Handicapped in the Pursuit of Justice, 51
OHIO ST. LJ. 687, 688-702 (1990) (discussing effect of several nonevidence sources on
juries, including the use of surrogate witnesses to present deposition testimony and the
use of presumptuous cross-examination questions); John H. Mansfield, Jury Notice, 74
GEO. LJ. 395, 406-07 (1985) (focusing on proper limits of use by jurors of their back-
ground knowledge and proposing as the proper test "that a substantial number of peo-
ple in the community have the information or hold the belief in question"); cf A. Leo
Levin & Robert J. Levy, Persuading the Jury with Facts Not in Evidence: The Fiction-
Science Spectrum, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 139 (1956) (discussing limits on introducing new
facts and ideas in attorney summation).
23. See infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
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academics convey to law students what constitutes evidence and in
the way that lawyers and courts at all levels discuss the term.
The central feature of the four-sources conception is the idea
that evidence encompasses only a fraction of the input that legiti-
mately influences fact finders. Under this conception evidence
comes only from certain sources within the trial proceeding: tes-
timony, exhibits, stipulations, and statements of judicial notice.24
As the account of the Dixon trial in Part II underscores, fact find-
ers legitimately employ much more than these four sources of in-
formation to resolve factual issues. This additional input does not
constitute evidence under the four-sources conception. However,
this is not problematic because the four-sources conception does
not require that triers must rely only on evidence to find facts.
Legal evidence has not always been limited to the four-
sources conception. In medieval England jurors were expected to
possess or obtain information on their own.2' Under this system
the courtroom trial was not an important source of information for
resolving litigated factual contentions.26 Much evidence was em-
bodied in jurors' background knowledge and in the input they
gained through personal investigations. By the mid-sixteenth cen-
24. See infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
25. In the thirteenth century jurors were expected "to make inquiries about the
facts of which they will have to speak when they come before the court. They must
collect testimony; they must weigh it and state the net result in a verdict." 2 SIR
FREDERICK POLLOCK & SIR FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 625 (2d ed. 1899) (footnote omitted); see also GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE PROOF
OF GUILT: A STUDY OF THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL 5 (3d ed. 1963) ("At first the
jury were judges and witnesses together, since they acted on their own supposed
knowledge, fortified by village gossip."). Medieval juries have commonly been de-
scribed as "self-informing." See eg., THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING
TO CONSCIENCE 16 (1985).
Some legal historians assert that early jurors reached verdicts based primarily
on personal knowledge gained out of court. See 1 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 333-34 (6th rev. ed. 1938). But see GREEN, supra, at 14
(contending that in criminal cases, "the trial jurors gave their verdict in open court, not
only upon their prior knowledge but also upon their viewing of the confrontation be-
tween the accused and the bench").
26. Beginning in the fourteenth century, witnesses were called to testify publicly
before the jury, but the distinction between witnesses and jurors was not complete, as
the two groups often joined in reaching a verdict. See John Marshall Mitnick, From
Neighbor-Witness to Judge of Proofs: The Transformation of the English Civil Juror, 32
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 201, 204 (1988). Moreover, jurors were still expected to have or
discover information on their own so that the trial remained only a partial source of fac-
tual information. See THAYER, supra note 6, at 170.
For a short history surrounding the implementation of the jury in England, see
JOHN P. DAwsoN, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 118-29 (1960).
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tury juries had become less self-informing, but it was still appro-
priate for them to rely on knowledge of facts gained outside of the
trial.V Indeed, even a century later in the landmark decision in
Bushell's Case, Chief Justice Vaughan concluded that a trial
judge could neither direct a verdict for the prosecution nor fine ju-
rors for a verdict conflicting with his direction because jurors
might have knowledge of relevant facts unknown to the judge.29
By the time of Blackstone, in the mid-eighteenth century, judges
instructed jurors who had personal knowledge about the disputed
events to reveal it so that the jurors could testify about them pub-
licly.3" However, jurors could also legitimately rely on knowledge
that they possessed by virtue of residing in the vicinage31 even if
they did not testify. 2 Courts viewed this information gained out-
27. See, eg., GREEN, supra note 25, at 108-09 (regarding criminal juries); Mitnick,
supra note 26, at 204-05 (regarding civil juries).
28. 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).
29. See id at 1012-13.
Chief Justice Vaughan has been criticized for exaggerating the extent to which
juries at that time were self-informed. At one point he stated, "the better and greater
part of the evidence may be wholly unknown to [the judge]; and this may happen in
most cases ..... " Id at 1013. This assertion surely went too far. While juries at that
time might have included members who knew something about the reputation of one of
the parties in many cases, and some information more directly relevant to the dispute in
a few cases, most jurors obtained the vast majority of their information through the trial
process. See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 25, at 245 ("Some of Vaughan's arguments based
on the self-informing role of the jury ring false, for they hark back to much earlier times
.... "); John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV.
263, 298-99 n.105 (1978) [hereinafter Langbein, Criminal Trial] (characterizing as pre-
tense the notion that juries in the mid-seventeenth century were self-informed to the
extent asserted by Vaughan).
30. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 375
(1966) (noting that "the practice... now universally obtains, that if a juror knows any
thing of the matter in issue, he may be sworn as a witness, and give his evidence pub-
licly in court.").
The question of the extent to which the fact finder legitimately relies upon
background knowledge is not a new one. The issue was of concern to Roman thinkers.
See Fraher, supra note 22, at 336-37 and authorities cited therein (discussing the roots
of background knowledge in Roman law).
31. See Mitnick, supra note 26, at 234 ("[It was exclusively the consideration of
specific knowledge, not the general variety, that the transformation outlawed .... ).
A study associated with the Chicago Jury Project revealed that.juror back-
ground knowledge is often decisive in both civil and criminal cases even in the modern
era. See Dale W. Broeder, The Impact of the Vicinage Requirement An Empirical
Look, 45 NEB. L. REv. 99 (1966) (describing jurors' use of information about their
neighborhood and from their personal backgrounds in a study of 23 consecutive trials).
32. See, e.g., DAWSON, supra note 26, at 127 ("For a full 500 years from its organi-
zation in the thirteenth century the trial jury of the common law courts retained its mix-
ture of elements.").
April 1997]
1216 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA W REVIEW
side of the trial process as evidence. Indeed, Blackstone described
two kinds of evidence: "that which is given in proof, or that which
the jury may receive by their own private knowledge."33
The conception of legal evidence as encompassing only a por-
tion of the information relied upon by jurors, and in particular,
only the portion of the information that came to them in the court-
room, began to emerge in the 1700s.3 A law of evidence devel-
oped35 as lawyers, representing parties with some regularity, con-
tinually urged judges to limit the information that jurors could
receive at the trial. This new law of evidence focused largely on
rules of admission rather than on the nature of proof or persua-
sion. Moreover, courts began granting new trials, at least in civil
cases, when the courts viewed the jury's verdict as erroneous.39 Ju-
rors were still allowed to employ their personal knowledge in de-
ciding cases,4 but judges' decisions to grant new trials were based
33. BLACKSTONE, supra note 30, at 368. However, Blackstone noted that the term,
"evidence," was commonly used to refer to only some portion of the new information
produced at the trial. See id. This suggests that there was some confusion about how to
understand the notion of evidence even in the eighteenth century.
34. See LORD CHIEF BARON GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1754).
35. See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 25, at 267 (noting "the development of a true law
of evidence in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries"); John H. Langbein,
Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U.
Cm. L REV. 1, 133 (1983) [hereinafter Langbein, Ryder Sources] (contending that rules
of evidence began to emerge in the middle of the eighteenth century).
36. However, in the criminal context the appearance of prosecution and defense
counsel in trials "cannot be called regular until the second half of the eighteenth cen-
tury." Langbein, Criminal Trial, supra note 29, at 263.
37. See, e.g., J. M. BEATrIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND 1660-1800, 362-
63 (1986); W. BEST, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE 133 (1849).
38. See THAYER, supra note 6, at 264 ("This excluding function is the characteristic
one in our law of evidence."); see also Langbein, Criminal Trial, supra note 29, at 300-
06 (discussing the emergence of the law of evidence as rules of exclusion and suggesting
the cause as the increased lawyerization of trials rather than simply distrust of juries).
39. See Mitnick, supra note 26, at 206-08 (discussing Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep.
1006 (C.P. 1670), and the judiciary's view that obstinate juries were a threat to social
order leading to a shift of power from the jury to the judge).
40. See, e.g., THAYER, supra note 6, at 170 ("[T]he jury's right to go upon their pri-
vate knowledge was emphatically recognized in 1670, and continued to be allowed in
the books well on into the next century .... "). By this time, however, jurors often were
not familiar with the parties or the dispute and relied on the information filtered
through the trial. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Origins of Public Prosecution at
Common Law, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 313, 314-15 (1973) [hereinafter Langbein, Ori-
gins] ("Probably in the later fifteenth century, but certainly by the sixteenth, it had be-
come expectable that jurors would be ignorant of the crimes they denounced and de-
termined.").
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on what the jury heard in the courtroom.4' For the first time
judges accepted the theory that personal knowledge fell outside
the sphere of evidence.
42
The notion also emerged that evidence encompassed only a
fraction of trial information-primarily the exhibits introduced
and the assertions contained in the testimony of witnesses.43 As
41. See THAYER, supra note 6, at 170. Thayer states:
[T]he enlarged practice of granting new trials, and the growth and devel-
opment of it in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was steadily
transforming the old jury into the modern one; and at last it was possible
for the judges to lay it down for law that a jury cannot give a verdict upon
their private knowledge.
Id.
42. The comments of the earliest English treatise on evidence continued to reflect
the view that personal knowledge was evidence:
The Evidence which the Jury have of the Fact is,
1. Being return'd of the Vicinage, whence the Cause of Action ariseth,
the Law supposeth them thence to have sufficient Knowledge to try the
Matter in Issue (and so they must) tho' no Evidence were given on either
Side in Court; but to this Evidence the Judge is a Stranger.
2. They may have Evidence from their own Personal Knowledge, by
which they may be assured, and sometimes are, that what is deposed in
Court is absolutely false; but to this the Judge is a Stranger, and he knoweth
no more of the Fact than he hath learned in Court, and perhaps by false
Depositions; and consequently knows nothing.
3. The Jury may know the Witnesses to be stigmatized and infamous;
which may be unknown to the Parties, and consequently to the Court.
4. In many Cases the Jury are to have View necessarily in many by Con-
sent, for their better Information; to this Evidence likewise the Judge is a
Stranger.
WILLIAM NELSON, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 2 (1717) (quoting Bushell's Case, 124 Eng.
Rep. at 1012). This early treatise, although written anonymously, has been attributed
to William Nelson. See BEATrIE, supra note 37, at 363 & n.120.
Modifications were made in this discussion, however, in a subsequent edition of
the Nelson work. In an article on judicial notice, Professor Thayer quoted the second
edition:
For centuries the jury used freely their private knowledge; it was their duty
to do so. They did, indeed, exercise a judicial function, but they were not
restrained by the doctrine of judicial notice. The change in their character
was a very gradual one. We may still read in the second edition, published
in 1735, of the anonymous "Law of Evidence," the doctrine about the jury
which was stated in Bushell's case: "The law supposeth them to have
knowledge of and capacity to try the Matter in Issue (and so they must),
though no Evidence were given on either side in court; but to this the Judge
is a Stranger; i.e., he cannot Judge without Evidence, though the Jury may."
James B. Thayer, Judicial Notice and the Law of Evidence, 3 HARV. L. REv. 285, 300
(1890) [hereinafter Thayer, Judicial Notice] (footnotes omitted) (quoting WILLIAM
NELSON, THE LAw OF EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1735)).
43. This view emerges, for example, in Gilbert's early treatise on the law of evi-
dence. See GILBERT, supra note 34. In that work Gilbert focuses on testimony and
written documents as the sources of evidence. See id. at 4-5 (describing as sources of
evidence two sorts of testimony, "unwritten testimony" and "written evidence," and
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early as 1790 James Wilson, one of the original Supreme Court
Justices and arguably "the most learned and profound legal
scholar of his generation,"" noted the tendency among early evi-
dence commentators45 to view legal evidence as limited to testi-
mony and documents.4 Wilson rejected this cramped view, noting
that fact finders legitimately relied on the statements of counsel,
among other sources:
It is generally supposed-and, indeed, our law books, so
far as I recollect, go upon the supposition-that the evi-
dence, which influences a court and jury, depends alto-
gether upon what is said by the witnesses, or read from
the papers. This, however, is very far from being the case.
Much depends on the pleadings of the counsel. His
pleadings depend much on a masterly knowledge and
management of the principles of evidence. Evidence is
the foundation of conviction: conviction is the foundation
of persuasion: to convey persuasion is the end of plead-
ing. From the principles of evidence, therefore, must be
drawn that train and tenour of reasoning, which will ac-
complish the aim of the pleader, and produce the perfec-
tion of his art.47
Indeed, Wilson thought evidence was better understood in relation
to various mental processes of the fact finder rather than to tangi-
discussing the preferred kinds of proof from among subclasses of these two categories).
44. Robert Green McCloskey, Introduction to THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 2
(Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967). Wilson was also a professor of law at the College
of Philadelphia. See i.d at 2,37; see also BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, "BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT" AND "PROBABLE CAUSE" 27 (1991) (noting Wilson's position at the school).
For a biography of Wilson's life, see CHARLES PAGE SMITH, JAMES WILSON: FOUNDING
FATHER (1956).
45. The earliest treatises on evidence included NELSON, supra note 42, and
GILBERT, supra note 34. Nelson's treatise, written anonymously, was first published in
1717. See Thayer, Judicial Notice, supra note 42, at 300 & n.4. Although Gilbert's trea-
tise was not published until the middle of the century, the work was prepared before
Gilbert's death in 1726. See SHAPIRO, supra note 44, at 269 n.96. Another notable
eighteenth century work in the field was John Morgan's Essays upon the Law of Evi-
dence, which appeared in 1789. See SHAPIRO, supra note 44, at 27. For a discussion of
the early treatises on evidence, see BEATrIE, supra note 37, at 363 n.120.
46. See James Wilson, Of the Nature and Philosophy of Evidence, in THE WORKS OF
JAMES WILSON 369, 398 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967). It appears that Wilson
viewed Gilbert's early treatise, see GILBERT, supra note 34, as chief among the works
conveying this view. Wilson referred to Gilbert's treatise several times in his essay, see
Wilson, supra, at 374, 382, 395, and Gilbert's work clearly conveyed the view opposed
by Wilson. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
47. Wilson, supra note 46, at 398.
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ble objects or statements of testifying witnessesi4 He traced these
mental processes to fourteen sources.9 Many of them related to
the fact finder's independent knowledge50 Wilson asserted "[t]he
powers and the operations of the human mind are the native and
original fountains of evidence,"'" not testimony and documents.
Despite Wilson's admonition, commentators continued to
conceive of evidence as less than all of the input influencing jurors.
During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, it was
typical for "discussion[s] of legal evidence to include or refer to
treatises on logic ... and modes of proof, '5 2 implying that fact
finding involved more information than the inert material pro-
vided by testimony and exhibits. Nonetheless, treatises frequently
portrayed evidence as coming only from certain identifiable
sources in the trial record. For example, in his influential 1816
treatise, S.M. Phillipps discussed only two sources of evidence-
the assertions of sworn witnesses and documents introduced in
court. 3 Others also adopted this two-sources view, most notably
Sir James Fitzjames Stephen in his famous effort to codify the
English law of evidence.
Consistent with this view, Thomas Starkie, another influential
scholar writing in the early 1800s, distinguished between testimony
and exhibits on the one hand and comments by trial judges and
lawyers about those items on the other.55 He defined evidence as
encompassing only the former: "[t]hat which is legally offered by
the litigant parties to induce a jury to decide for or against the
4& See id. at 374, 398.
49. See id at 374-75.
50. See id at 374-98 (discussing each of the 14 sources of the mental processes).
51. Id. at 398.
52. SHAPIRO, supra note 44, at 30.
53. See S.M. PHILLiPPS, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1816). Phillipps's assumptions
about the limits of legal evidence were revealed in the first two paragraphs of the work,
which declared that the first part of the treatise concerned witness testimony and the
concluding part related to written evidence. See id. at 1-2. At no point did Phillipps
suggest that evidence might also come, for example, from the prior knowledge of the
fact finders or from the arguments of counsel.
54. See SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (5th
ed. 1901). Writing in the 1870s, Stephen defined "evidence" as: "(1) Statements made
by witnesses in court under a legal sanction, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry;
such statements are called oral evidence; (2) Documents produced for the inspection of
the court or judge; such documents are called documentary evidence." Id at 4.
55. See 1 THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
(7th ed. 1842) [hereinafter STARKIE, TREATISE]. The first edition of Starkie's treatise
was published in 1824. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 4, at 527 (citing T.
STARKIE, EVIDENCE (1824)).
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party alleging such facts, as contradistinguished from all comment
and argument on the subject, fall within the description of evi-
dence."56 Comment and argument aided fact finders in their judg-
ment. Starkie noted, however, that this information was merely
"probatio artificialis" in Roman law s5 and he did not view it as
evidence.
This Anglo-American view of evidence, excluding comments
by attorneys and judges and the jurors' background knowledge,
bears close relation to an important philosophical tradition-
"English empiricism, as exemplified by Locke, Bentham and...
Mill."" Professor Barbara Shapiro has documented the role of this
epistemological view in the development of our law of evidence.
English empiricists posited that there exists a "world of fact" that
is "independent of our beliefs about it."' While the law usually
cannot achieve certainty about past events, one can judge recon-
structions according to levels of probability." Inferences about ul-
timate facts from known facts were also possible based on "a
straightforward application of ordinary common sense or practical
reasoning."6 2 Empiricists believe that societal members can draw
these inferences based on "a universal cognitive competence ' r -
"a shared stock of knowledge," as William Twining described itf4
On this assumption, little reason existed to focus on the reasoning
process and the underlying knowledge involved. This reasoning
process should not change significantly from one observer to an-
other.6
56. STARKIE, TREATISE, supra note 55, at 8-9.
57. See iL at 422. Starkie's comments also indicate that attorney comment was
much more confined at that point in English history than in present-day practice in this
country. See icL at 422-24.
58. William Twining, Evidence and Legal Theory, in LEGAL THEORY AND COMMON
LAW 62,70 (William Twining ed., 1986).
59. See Barbara J. Shapiro, "To A Moral Certainty": Theories of Knowledge and
Anglo-American Juries 1600-1850, 38 HASTINGS L.i. 153 (1986) (discussing the relation-
ship between a jury's evaluation of evidence and the developments of epistemology in
England).
60. Twining, supra note 58, at 70.
61. See Shapiro, supra note 59, at 176-77.
62. Twining, supra note 58, at 70.
63. See L. Jonathan Cohen, Freedom of Proof, in FACrs IN LAW 1, 2 (William
Twining ed., 1983).
64. Twining, supra note 58, at 70.
65. Eighteenth and nineteenth century commentators on evidence did not speak
uniformly on this point. Jeremy Bentham implied, in his philosophical work on evi-
dence, that evidence includes the preexisting knowledge of the fact finder. See JEREMY
BENTHAM, A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 12-13(1825) (discussing circumstantial
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This theoretical perspective drawn from English empiricism '
survived through the great writers dominating the field of legal
evidence during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.6 7
For example, Professor Thayer viewed evidence as no more than
that input embodied by the four-sources conception. Signifi-
evidence and real evidence as that deduced, presumably by the juror). For example,
Bentham asserts that "[t]he argument drawn from the impossibility or improbability of
an alleged fact... comes to be that of counter-testimony, and, at bottom, is nothing
more than circumstantial evidence." Id. at 276. In his more explicit attempts to define
evidence, Bentham also arguably included preexisting knowledge of fact finders within
the notion of "real evidence." See id. at 12. His discussion of circumstantial evidence,
however, suggests- that such preexisting knowledge was limited to matters nearly uni-
formly and immediately comprehended by all fact finders. See id. at 144. Some knowl-
edge surely is of this sort. However, one treatise noted that the fund of shared infor-
mation did not cover all the preexisting knowledge that jurors employ to decide cases.
See e.g., 1 BEST ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (James A. Morgan ed.,
1882). It was stated:
As the knowledge, observation, and experience of men vary in every
imaginable degree, their notions of possibility and probability might natu-
rally be expected to differ; and we continually find that, not only are the
most opposite judgments formed as to the credence due to alleged facts, but
that a fact which one man considers both possible and probable, another
holds to be physically impossible.
Id. at 10.
66. See 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 3 n.2
(Peter Tillers ed., 1983) (editorial note indicating that Wigmore's theoretical approach
was drawn from English empiricism).
67. Who were the early giants of evidence scholarship in this country? Professors
Charles Wright and Kenneth Graham convey their views in the following excerpt from
their treatise:
Though Judge Swift of Connecticut had written the first American book
on evidence as early as 1810 it does not appear to have had any consider-
able influence. The first important treatise written in this country was pub-
lished by Simon Greenleaf in 1842. Written for his classes at the Harvard
Law School, it was to become the authoritative statement of the law for the
rest of the 19th Century, going through some 16 editions by 1899. Green-
leafs treatise marked not only the beginning of American evidence scholar-
ship but also began the domination of that scholarship by the Harvard
School of writers-Thayer, Wigmore, and Morgan, to name only the giants.
21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 20 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
68. See James B. Thayer, Presumptions and the Law of Evidence, 3 HARV. L. REV.
141, 143 (1889) [hereinafter Thayer, Presumptions]. Writing in the 1880s, Professor
Thayer defined evidence as "any matter of fact which is furnished to a legal tribunal
otherwise than by reasoning, as the basis of inference in ascertaining some other matter
of fact." Id. This definition appeared potentially broader than the four-sources con-
ception. However, Thayer's treatise on evidence published only a few years later im-
plied that he saw evidence as no broader than the four-sources view. For example,
while Thayer asserted that Stephen's view of evidence-encompassing only testimony
and documents-was clearly erroneous, his counter was only that Stephen's definition
failed to account for what Bentham had called "real evidence." See THAYER, supra
note 6, at 263 n.1. Indeed, Thayer only clearly indicated in his treatise that evidence in
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cantly, Thayer advanced an expansive theory of judicial notice that
rationalized the use of preexisting knowledge by jurors.69 This
view is much broader than the prevailing idea of judicial notice as
a formal statement by a judge regarding the existence of particular
facts.0 Still, Thayer did not view this preexisting knowledge held
by jurors as evidence.7' He also did not view attorney argument as
a jury trial came from two general sources: visible objects presented to the tribunal and
oral or written testimony of sworn witnesses. See id at 263 (describing as examples of
evidence "a visible object" or "testimony, oral or written" presented to the tribunal as a
ground for inference). He did not clearly indicate that judicially noticed facts were evi-
dence. See id at 277-312 (discussing judicial notice). Indeed, his expansive view of ju-
dicial notice implied that much of what he thought was properly noticed was not evi-
dence. See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. He also did not discuss formal
stipulations between litigants as evidence. Further, Thayer explicitly excluded from the
category of evidence the preexisting knowledge of fact finders and the information
conveyed in the arguments of the lawyers. This point is evident in Thayer's discussion
of what constitutes evidence:
But when one offers "evidence," in the sense of the word which is now un-
der consideration, he offers, otherwise than by reference to what is already
known, to prove a matter of fact which is to be used as a basis of inference
to another matter of fact. He offers, perhaps, to present to the senses of the
tribunal a visible object which may furnish a ground of inference; or he of-
fers testimony, oral or written, to prove a fact .... In giving evidence we
are furnishing to a tribunal a new basis for reasoning. This is not saying
that we do not have to reason in order to ascertain this basis; it is merely
saying that reasoning alone will not, or at least does not, supply it. The new
element thus added is what we call the evidence.
THAYER, supra note 6, at 263-64 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 270-71 (contending
that the reasoning process, which builds upon the "great body of facts and ideas" that a
fact finder already possesses at the beginning of an inquiry, "does not belong to the re-
gion of the law of evidence").
69. Thayer saw a trial judge as capable of noticing a broad range of preexisting
knowledge, see for example, THAYER, supra note 6, at 301-06, and asserted that even a
jury could rely upon such information whether or not it had been formally noticed by
the trial court. See id. at 296 ("But as the jury is bound to keep within the restrictions
imposed upon courts by the principle of judicial notice, so also it has the liberty which
that principle allows to courts.").
70. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 201(g). This provision contemplates that the trial judge
will formally instruct the jury regarding any fact to be judicially noticed.
71. In his pioneering discussion of judicial notice, Thayer did not clarify what, if
any, part of the category of judicially noticed facts, as he understood that category,
amounted to evidence and what part amounted to nonevidence. However, the breadth
of the category of judicially noticed facts, as Thayer described it, strongly suggests that
he did not consider all judicially noticed facts as constituting evidence. At least some of
those facts overlapped with the "great body of facts and ideas" that fact finders brought
with them to the proceeding and employed in the reasoning process. See THAYER, su-
pra note 6, at 270-71. Thayer explicitly stated that this preexisting knowledge was not
evidence. See id at 263-64. The Advisory Committee's note to Rule 201 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence also concluded that Thayer did not view this information as evidence
but rather as "non-evidence facts." See FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee's note.
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Professor Thayer recognized that this view of legal evidence
did not accord with our conception of evidence from normal par-
lance. He openly acknowledged that much information upon
which jurors rely to find facts did not qualify as legal evidence.7
He also acknowledged the import of this conclusion: "It must be
noticed, then, that 'evidence,' in the sense used when we speak of
the law of evidence, has not the large meaning imputed to it in or-
dinary discourse."74
Professor Wigmore, Thayer's student, was of the same view.
At the outset of his treatise, Wigmore did not offer a tight defini-
tion of legal evidence, contending that such an effort was "of little
practical consequence. 75 For Wigmore the process of presenting
"elemental facts" differed from "the process of piecing together." 6
He saw only the former as involving evidence; the latter fell within
the distinguishable ambit of argument." Likewise, in his discus-
sion of judicial notice, Wigmore conceded the need for a jury to
rely on its preexisting knowledge. But he asserted that a jury's
authority is closely confined to the reasoning process, and he im-
plied, consistent with Thayer's view, that such knowledge is not
evidence.78 Thus, like Thayer, Wigmore believed that evidence did
not encompass all of the operational input that legitimately influ-
ences the fact finder.79
72. See THAYER, supra note 6, at 264.
73. See id. at 270 (acknowledging that the jurors brought to the trial and relied
upon "a great body of facts and ideas... of which no particle of 'evidence,' strictly so
called, is ever formally presented in court."). Thayer also acknowledged the impor-
tance of the fact finder's function in the argumentation process. See i. at 271. How-
ever, he saw it as mere "reasoning" from what was already known and, therefore, not
evidence. See it at 264 ("In giving evidence we are furnishing to a tribunal a new basis
for reasoning.").
74. Id. at 264.
75. WIGMORE, supra note 66, at 7. In the editorial notes to the most recent edition,
however, Professor Tillers contends that Wigmore failed to acknowledge the impor-
tance of how we define evidence. See id. at 7 n.4.
76. Id. at 6-7.
77. See id. at 7.
78. See 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 726-31
(James H. Chadbourn ed., 1983).
79. Wigmore most assuredly believed lawyers should study the reasoning process
essential to infer facts from what he called the "elemental facts" established by the ju-
ridical evidence. See WIGMORE, supra note 66, at 6-7. He published a book for law
students on this topic. See JoHN HENRY WIGMORE, THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL
PROOF (2d ed. 1913) [hereinafter THE PRINCIPLES].
Interestingly, Wigmore conceded that the topic of this book was properly un-
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Since Thayer's time this restrictive view has continued to
strongly influence legal thinking about evidence. The Advisory
Committee that drafted the Federal Rules of Evidence, for exam-
ple, accepted this conception in its comments concerning judicial
notice.0 The Committee conceded that "every case involves the
use of hundreds or thousands of non-evidence facts."8  It also
stated that these "non-evidence" facts, unlike "adjudicative
facts,"' "could not possibly be introduced into evidence." The
Committee did not closely define the proper limits of "non-
evidence facts" or how to distinguish them from "adjudicative
fact." '84  Nonetheless, the Committee made clear that evidence
does not include much information upon which jurors legitimately
rely to find facts.
derstood as a "study of the principles of Evidence." 1d at 1. As already noted, his
treatise indicated that he did not believe the reasoning process itself involved the use of
"evidence." See supra text accompanying notes 75-79. The explanation for this appar-
ent contradiction appears to be that in his book on judicial proof Wigmore was speak-
ing of evidence, not in a formal legal sense as he had in his treatise, but more in accor-
dance with how we use that term in general parlance. This dual usage of the term by
Wigmore did not reflect the same muddling of ideas that prompted this Article. This
Article focuses on the tendency of lawyers to think of evidence in accordance with the
four-sources view and their tendency, as well, to think evidence covers everything that
legitimately influences the fact finder. This process involves a combining of the two
conceptions. The context of Wigmore's discussion at least gave some indication that he
simply moved from one conception of evidence to another rather than intermingling
the two conceptions.
80. The federal rules do not include a definition of evidence. See FED. R. EVID.
81. FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee's notes (citing Kenneth Culp Davis, A
System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience, PERSPECnVES OF LAW
69,73 (1964)).
82 ld. The Committee borrowed the term "adjudicative facts" from Kenneth Culp
Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV.
L. REV. 364, 404-07 (1942), but "seems to have altered the meaning of the term
slightly." Fraher, supra note 22, at 333 n.5.
83. FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee's note.
84. The Advisory Committee defined "adjudicative facts" as those "which relate to
the parties," consistent with a definition provided by Professor Davis. Id. (citing Davis,
supra note 82, at 404-07). This definition, however, was offered by Professor Davis to
distinguish "adjudicative facts" from "legislative facts." Id. (citing Davis, supra note 82,
at 404-07). It was of no help in separating "adjudicative facts" from "non-evidence
facts." Id.
85. Like Thayer, the Advisory Committee may have assumed that this use of non-
evidentiary facts arose primarily in the reasoning process and that it was largely the
same among all persons. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. The Advisory
Committee quoted Thayer's assertion that "not a step can be taken without assuming
something which has not been proved; and the capacity to do this with competent
judgement and efficiency, is imputed to judges and juries as part of their necessary
mental outfit." FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee's notes (quoting THAYER,
supra note 6, at 279-80).
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The most obvious manifestation of the four-sources concep-
tion of legal evidence appears in the pattern instructions employed
in jury trials across the country. The following instruction, prom-
ulgated by the District Judges Association of the United States
Sixth Circuit, exemplifies the approach typically followed:
1.04 Evidence Defined
(1) You must make your decision based only on the evi-
dence that you saw and heard here in court. Do not let
rumors, suspicions, or anything else that you may have
seen or heard outside of court influence your decision in
any way.
(2) The evidence in this case includes only what the wit-
nesses said while they were testifying under oath; the ex-
hibits that I allowed into evidence; the stipulations that
the lawyers agreed to; and the facts that I have judicially
noticed.
(3) Nothing else is evidence. The lawyers' statements
and arguments are not evidence. Their questions and
objections are not evidence. My legal rulings are not evi-
dence. And my comments and questions are not evi-
dence.
(4) [Material that was ruled inadmissible or that was
stricken from the record is also not evidence and should
not be considered.]
(5) Make your decision based only on the evidence, as I
have defined it here, and nothing else. 6
The Sixth Circuit instructions also tell the jurors, in seeming con-
tradiction to instruction 1.04, that they may consider additional
factors such as their "common sense," "everyday experience with
people and events," and circumstantial evidence." Yet, there is
no suggestion that these additional sources of information also
constitute evidence. Some courts also explicitly tell jurors that
they may consider certain other sources of nonevidentiary infor-
mation such as opening statements by counsel.8 9 These instruc-
86. Sixth Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, in MODERN FEDERAL JURY
INSTRUCrIONS 6-17 (1991).
87. d at 6-18 (Rule 1.05).
88. See id. at 6-20 (Rule 1.06).
89. In the Ninth Circuit, for example, jurors are told explicitly that while opening
statements and summations are not evidence, the jury should consider them. See, e.g.,
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tions reflect the prevailing notion that evidence does not encom-
pass all of the input that appropriately influences the trier's factual
judgmentsogo
Reviewing courts also promulgate this view of evidence.
Many judicial opinions hold that the fact finder can appropriately
consider certain information that is not evidence. Courts have
reached this conclusion regarding a variety of information falling
outside the four-sources conception, including the demeanor of
parties in the courtroom while not testifying,9' information gained
Ninth Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, in MODERN FEDERAL JURY IN-
STRUCTIONS 9-18 (1991) (Instruction 3.05(1)) ("Arguments and statements by lawyers
are not evidence. The lawyers are not witnesses. What they have said in their opening
statements, closing arguments, and at other times is intended to help you interpret the
evidence, but it is not evidence."). In the federal trial courts in the Sixth Circuit, jurors
are told merely that the judge's statements about the law should control over any
statements made by the lawyers, suggesting that jurors may, in general, consider the
lawyers' statements. See Sixth Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, supra note 86,
at 6-2 (Instruction 1.02(3)). In other federal circuits, however, jurors are frequently told
that the opening statements and closing arguments are not evidence. See, e.g., Eighth
Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, in MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 8-
4 (1991) (Instruction 1.03(1)) ("Statements, arguments, questions and comments by
lawyers representing the parties in the case are not evidence.").
90. This four-sources view of evidence, or a view that evidence comes from even
fewer than four sources, pervades the pattern instructions used in federal trial courts in
other circuits. See, e.g., Seventh Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, in MODERN
FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 7-3 (1991) (Instruction 1.07) ("The evidence consists of
the sworn testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits received in evidence, and stipulated,
admitted, or judicially noticed facts.... You are to consider only the evidence received
in this case."); Eighth Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, supra note 89, at 8-4
(Instruction 1.03) ("'Evidence' includes the testimony of witnesses, documents and
other things received as exhibits, any facts that have been stipulated-that is, formally
agreed to by the parties, and any facts that have been judicially noticed-that is, facts
which I say you may, but are not required to, accept as true, even without evidence.");
Ninth Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, supra note 89, at 9-1 (Instruction 1.01)
("It will be your duty to decide from the evidence what the facts are.... The evidence
will consist of the testimony of witnesses, documents, and other things received into
evidence as exhibits and any facts on which the lawyers agree or which I may instruct
you to accept."); Eleventh Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, in MODERN
FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 11-3 to 11-4 (1991) (Instruction 4.1) ("As stated earlier
you must consider only the evidence that I have admitted in the case. The term
'evidence' includes the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits admitted in the rec-
ord.").
91. See, e.g., United States v. Schipani, 293 F. Supp. 156, 163 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), affd
414 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1969) (where, in bench trial, court considered demeanor of non-
testifying defendant, court later stated that it had found defendant's guilt "on the rec-
ord," but that "[c]onfirmation came from observation of the defendant in court");
Henriod v. Henriod, 89 P.2d 222, 224-25 (Wash. 1938) (affirming, despite trial court's
reliance in part on demeanor of party while not testifying because, without characteriz-
ing the information as "evidence," court concluded that trier was entitled to take note
of party's demeanor throughout the proceeding). Some commentators have described
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from a jury view,92 information conveyed in closing arguments,93
and information jurors possess as part of their background knowl-
edge.9
This view also dominates the way that we teach law students
to think of evidence. Coursebooks on evidence usually imply by
their coverage or explicitly state that evidence comes only from
witness testimony and trial exhibits. 95 The coursebooks may also
cover judicial notice and stipulations as additional methods of es-
tablishing some incidental facts, but they do not uniformly agree
that these are sources of evidence.96 This approach both reflects
this information, however, as a form of real evidence. See, e.g., Jerome Michael &
Mortimer J. Adler, Real Proof 1, 5 VAND. L. REV. 344,365 (1952).
92. See, e.g., Burns v. Janes, 398 A.2d 1125, 1129 (R.I. 1979) (jury view does not
provide evidence); Brookhaven Supply Co. v. DeKalb County, 216 S.E.2d 694, 696
(Ga. Ct. App. 1975) (noting the jury's view is not evidence); see also Imwinkelried, su-
pra note 15, at 191 (noting that while not held universally, "the prevailing view is that a
jury view is not evidence"). Commentators have typically favored the position that a
view provides a form of real evidence. Some have concluded that this is the modem
majority position of the courts. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 1196 & n.15 (1995).
93. See, e.g., Kuehl v. Hamilton, 297 P. 1043, 1044-45 (Or. 1931) (affirming trial
court's conclusion that remark in counsel's summation relating personal experience of
counsel was "not evidence," but was, nonetheless, properly offered by counsel and
properly considered by the jury); see also WIGMORE, supra note 66, at 6 n.3 and
authorities cited therein ("Innumerable decisions make the distinction between argu-
ment and evidence.").
94. See, e.g., Jenney Elec. Co. v. Branham, 41 N.E. 448,451 (Ind. 1895) (stating that
jurors' "extensive experiences" and "education" should not be "laid aside in passing
upon the inducements which may surround a witness to speak falsely," but not declar-
ing such information to be "evidence"); Rostad v. Portland Ry., Light & Power Co., 201
P. 184, 186, 188 (Or. 1921) (rejecting claim that trial court erred in instructing jurors to
consider their "experience as men of affairs" because, in analyzing "the evidence," fact
finders cannot "be divested of general knowledge of practical affairs"); Tennessee Gas
Transmission Co. v. Hall, 277 S.W.2d 733, 735-37 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) (holding that
jurors were entitled to consider their common knowledge that certain forms of plowing
would reach a certain depth and potentially damage buried gas pipeline though court
did not call such knowledge "evidence").
95. For a sample of modem evidence coursebooks, see for example, RONALD L.
CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES (3d ed. 1991); RICHARD 0. LEMPERT &
STEPHEN A. SALTzBURG, A MODERN APPROACH To EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS,
TRANSCRIPTS AND CASES (1977); MUELLER & IRKPATRICK, supra note 4; JON R.
WALTZ & ROGER C. PARK, CASES AND MATERIAl S ON EVIDENCE (8th ed. 1995);
WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4.
96. The coursebooks typically do not treat other information as evidence. They
never suggest, for example, that the opening statements, the questions, or the summa-
tions of counsel should be understood as evidence. The materials raising problems of
logical relevance surely will hint to the observant student that jurors, like judges ruling
on admissibility, must employ a fund of preexisting knowledge in drawing inferences.
Yet, there also is no indication in the coursebooks that this knowledge should be
viewed as evidence. Typically, if they cover demeanor of witnesses or of nontestifying
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and reinforces the dominant view held within the profession.
Modem treatises on the subject also reflect this restrictive
conception of legal evidence? The treatises do not explicitly de-
fine evidence in accordance with this restrictive conception, but
they typically imply by their focus, as well as by specific state-
ments, that evidence is primarily testimony and exhibits.98 Indeed,
they suggest a two-sources conception because they do not typi-
cally include judicial notice instructions or stipulations.
Judicial opinions, classroom instruction, and modem treatises
show that lawyers today generally understand legal evidence as
emanating from only a few, specific sources. This conclusion does
not necessarily mean that lawyers generally equate the limits of
evidence with the limits of legitimate proof. As we have already
noted, there is general recognition that information outside the
four-sources can legitimately influence a fact finder's decision,"
However, lawyers do tend to confuse the boundaries of the four-
sources conception of evidence with the boundaries of legitimate
proof. Part IV focuses on this problem.
IV. INTERFERENCE FROM THE BROADER CONCEPTION OF
EVIDENCE
Although lawyers generally embrace the four-sources concep-
tion of legal evidence, they sometimes adopt the alternative view
that legal evidence encompasses all that the fact finder legitimately
considers."O A problem arises, however, because lawyers tend to
parties, the coursebooks do not suggest that this information might appropriately be
understood as evidence. For an exception on this score, however, see WEINSTEIN ET
AL., supra note 4, at 115-30. The one general exception to the restrictive conception,
which the coursebooks typically have noted, concerns the disagreement that has arisen
in the courts over whether jury views are sources of evidence.
97. A sample of leading hornbooks include GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCrION
To THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1978); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 92; JOHN
WILLIAM STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE (4th ed. 1992).
98. For an example of a particular statement suggesting this restrictive view of what
constitutes evidence, consider the following:
When attorneys contemplate litigation, their evaluation of prospective
evidential materials departs sharply from that of other professionals or lay
persons: lawyers must anticipate the impact the rules of evidence will have
upon the admissibility of these materials should a judicial trial be necessary.
At trial, the rules of evidence may operate to exclude all or part of the prof-
fered testimony or tangible items; evidence so rejected will not be considered
in the decisional process of the tribunal.
LILLY, supra note 97, at 2-3 (second emphasis added).
99. See supra notes 7-22 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 6.
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confuse the two ideas rather than recognize them as competing
conceptions. We sometimes end up defining evidence according to
the four-sources conception while simultaneously concluding that
evidence constitutes everything that legitimately influences the
fact finder.0 1 This confusion frequently occurs by implication in
law school teaching, misleading students about the nature of the
fact finding process. Through our almost singular focus on admis-
sibility questions-and our further concentration on testimony-
we imply that evidence covers only a few things and that these are
the only components worth discussing that are involved in produc-
ing factual conclusions. Of course, relevance problems, which
coursebooks typically provide in abundance, can expose students
to the need, not only for the judge but also for the fact finder, to
rely on information external to the testimony and exhibits to reach
factual determinations.' °2 However, questions of relevance do not
fully explore issues of proof since the threshold questions of rele-
vance involve relatively lax standards."3 Also, for the instructor to
101. A tendency to think of legal evidence as encompassing all sources of proof has
long coexisted with the dominant, four-sources conception. Courts and scholars com-
monly assert that legal evidence includes "'all the means by which any.., fact [in dis-
pute at a judicial trial] is established or disproved."' Lyman Ray Patterson, Evidence:
A Functional Meaning, 18 VAND. L. REv. 875, 876 (1965) (quoting In re Everts, 121
N.W.2d 487, 490 (Neb. 1963)); see also 22 Ci. Evidence § 1 (1920) ("[T]he term
'evidence' includes all the means by which any alleged matter of fact, the truth of which
is submitted to investigation, is established or disproved."). However, while this broad
definition may accord with the meaning of evidence in ordinary language, the commen-
tators who have espoused it have failed to note that the dominant conception of legal
evidence is actually more restrictive. Cf. Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a
Theory of Evidence, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 604, 616-17 (1994) (noting the conventional
view of legal evidence does not help explain how a trier reaches factual judgments be-
cause that view does not embody much information that goes into reaching them). By
failing to note the dual conception of evidence they embrace, lawyers risk the errone-
ous inference that anything that is not evidence, as defined by the four-sources concep-
tion, is not appropriately considered in deciding the facts in a dispute.
102. For the view of a leading evidence teacher on the incidental tendency of the
evidence course to convey information about how triers find facts, see PAUL F.
ROTHSTEIN, EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL 1 (1970) ("You will be asked to master a body
of legal prohibitions; but such mastery should yield, as an incidental benefit, some use-
ful insights into how minds come to accept propositions of fact as true."). However, I
do not believe the typical course conveys many of these insights.
103. Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence defines "relevant evidence" as
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401. Additional rules of relevance appear in Ar-
ticle IV, the most important of which is Rule 403, which provides that even relevant
evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consid-
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explore the complexity of the reasoning processes different jurors
might employ, and the extent of the nonevidentiary information
involved, would take a substantial block of time typically unavail-
able in evidence courses.0 4 Further, we hardly discuss many of the
other important aspects of proper factual persuasion such as the
ordering of testimony, the demeanor of the witnesses, and the
statements, questions, and arguments of the parties and attorneys.
The typical evidence course fails to convey to students either the
full complement of influences that operate on fact finders or the
process by which fact finders infer facts.
Understanding the rules of testimonial admissibility is only
incidental to the larger effort of proof as the story of the Dixon
trial in Part II underscores. Were it otherwise, all of my colleagues
who were attorneys at the Public Defender Service should have
had roughly similar success records in trials of roughly similar dif-
ficulty since all of the lawyers knew the fundamentals of evidence.
The reality, however, was that their success rate in trials was
enormously varied. A few attorneys repeatedly gained acquittals
in seemingly difficult cases while a few others regularly lost seem-
ingly winnable trials. This was true largely because the process of
fact finding is complicated and heavily dependent on input not
conventionally characterized as evidence. The typical evidence
course teaches little about the overall process. Its narrow focus
suggests that facts essentially leap from testimony and exhibits.
The misleading message of the typical evidence class also fre-
quently goes uncorrected by other courses."' A few students may
gain a sense of the complicated nature of fact finding through
clinical or simulation classes. However, these courses typically
have small enrollments, and in any event, usually cannot focus
heavily on the analytical and psychological dimensions of proof.
Law schools have sometimes instituted classes focusing on the
erations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence." FED. R. EVID. 403.
104. The complicated nature of the threshold relevance inquiry is often overlooked.
For one indication of its complexity, see Stephen A. Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of
Relevance: Countering Negative Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66
CAL. L. REv. 1011, 1019 (1978) (demonstrating the need, in deciding whether to ex-
clude, to recognize "that part of proving a case may involve meeting a jury's expecta-
tions about proof-that is, satisfying the expectations of triers of fact who logically rea-
son that a party whose position is sound should have evidence on particular points").
105. See William Twining, Taking Facts Seriously, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 22,40 (1984)
("[R]arely is fact finding as such directly studied in a systematic, comprehensive, and
rigorous manner.").
[Vol. 30:1199
April 19971 COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF "EVIDENCE" 1231
theoretical analysis of the proof process.'O° The most notable, per-
haps, was Wigmore's course at Northwestern,1°7 which was based
on his relatively unheralded book on judicial proof.' These scat-
tered attempts have not spread widely.' 9 The result is that law
schools have largely avoided systematically engaging law students
in rigorous analysis of the process of proof.
The conflation of the two conceptions of evidence by legal
educators has confused the two conceptions in the minds of stu-
dents. On reflection, legal educators know that proving facts in-
volves much more than simply amassing the data embodied in tes-
timony and exhibits. Many reasons can be offered for our decision
to forego engaging students in more of the critical fact finding is-
sues.1 One important reason is that we believe we already engage
students well on this level, based in part on our tendency to view
the four-sources as the primary legitimate basis for factual deci-
sions. Unfortunately, our approach sends students into the legal
world with a distorted view of how facts are established in courts.
The tendency to mix the two conceptions of evidence also
causes difficulty in resolving actual cases. Courts can easily mis-
calculate the evidentiary basis for verdicts and the harmfulness of
attorney errors through confusing of the two theories. The conse-
quences of this judicial confusion over the definition of evidence
can be seen in a variety of contexts.
The muddling can arise when courts focus on whether certain
nonevidence, as defined by the four-sources conception, should be
considered as supporting a verdict. One instance occurs when re-
106. See id. at 28.
107. See id. at 27-28 (discussing Wigmore's evidence course at Northwestern).
108. See WIGMORE, THE PRINCIPLES, supra note 79.
109. See Twining, supra note 105, at 28.
As indicated in the text, I believe that the typical evidence course fails to con-
vey to students either the full extent of legitimate influences on fact finders or to en-
gage students in much analysis of the way that fact finders find facts from the opera-
tional input to which they are exposed. Some courses do give students a better
perspective though it is difficult to teach both widely and deeply in this area because of
the complexity of the proof process. Materials currently exist that are designed to en-
gage students in rigorous analysis of the inferential process. See, e.g., TERENCE
ANDERSON & WILLIAM TWINING, ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE: How To DO THINGS WITH
FACTS BASED ON WIGMORE'S SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF (1991). Also, materials exist
that are designed to serve as a basis for teaching a unified course in evidence and trial
advocacy. See, e.g., 1 ROBERT B. BURNS ET AL., PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS IN
EVIDENCE AND TRIAL ADVOCACY (1994); MICHAEL R. FONTHAM, TRIAL TECHNIQUE
AND EVIDENCE (1995).
110. See Twining, supra note 105, at 32-42.
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information should be considered in cases where it appears highly
important. The Texas Supreme Court's opinion in Texas & New
Orleans R.R. v. Grace".. provides an example of this problem. The
dispute focused on whether the operators of a train that struck and
killed a drunken man had attempted to brake as soon as they no-
ticed him on the tracks.12 The trial court submitted special issues
on the ground of discovered peril on which the jury returned a
verdict for the family of the dead man."' An intermediate appel-
late court, relying in part on palpable evasiveness by the train op-
erators in testifying for the defense, rejected the railroad com-
pany's contention that there was insufficient evidence to support
submission of the special issues.14  The Texas Supreme Court,
however, agreed with the company and set aside the judgment."'
That court concluded that the questionable credibility of the op-
erators' testimony could not support the plaintiff's claims that the
operators had seen the deceased well before braking."6 The rea-
son given was simply that the witnesses' questionable credibility
was not evidence to prove the opposite of their assertions."' The
court's conclusion as to what constitutes evidence coincided with
the four-sources conception of evidence. Yet, the view that infor-
mation not qualifying as evidence could not support the plaintiff's
allegations mistakenly relied on the broader conception of evi-
dence. As a result, the Texas court failed to meaningfully confront
why negative credibility information was not proper proof of the
plaintiff's contentions.
Similar confusion has emerged as to whether information ob-
tained through a viewing can support a verdict. The Oregon Su-
preme Court's decision in Jack v. Hunt? provides an example.
111. 188 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. 1945).
112. See id- at 380-81.
113. See id. at 379.
114. See Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Grace, 185 S.W.2d 219, 221-22 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1944). The intermediate court also noted that photographs demonstrated that the
operators could easily have seen the man long before they claimed to have first noticed
him. See id. at 221. In addition, that court noted that there was testimony that the
emergency equipment had been sounded and that the fireman reportedly had yelled,
"Hold it, that will do," which could have been understood as meaning "that the whis-
tling was not going to get the deceased off the track." Id. at 222.
115. See Texas & New Orleans R.R., 188 S.W.2d at 381.
116. See i& at 380.
117. See ic. "The fact that the testimony of an interested witness is not accepted as
evidence in his favor does not operate to convert it into evidence against him." Id.
118. 264 P.2d 461 (Or. 1953), affd on reh'g, 265 P.2d 251 (Or. 1954).
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preme Court's decision in Jack v. Huntns provides an example.
There, Ms. Jack sold the Hunts a tract of land next to a small tract
that Ms. Jack retained and on which she lived in a small house. 9
Several years later the Hunts obstructed what Ms. Jack claimed
was an implied easement created upon the severance of the two
tracts and leading to the area behind her home.1 20 The trial court
conducted a view of the area, and ultimately issued an injunction
in Ms. Jack's favor, concluding that the alleged easement had been
created.12' However, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed and en-
tered a judgment for the Hunts, declaring that there was "no evi-
dence of a defined roadway leading from the road in question to
the rear of the plaintiff's premises. ' Ms. Jack petitioned for re-
hearing noting that "the trial court on view of the premises ob-
served a well-defined roadway leading to the rear of the plaintiff's
property."' The Oregon Supreme Court rejected this contention
with a single sentence: "This view of the property by the trial
court was not in itself evidence, but was only for the purpose of
giving the court a better understanding of the evidence to be of-
fered." 24 Of course, under the four-sources conception, a view is
not evidence, but the fact finder can still consider the information
obtained as providing proof of a disputed proposition. To say that
a view is not evidence and, therefore, should not be considered as
tending to prove anything is to muddle the two conceptions of evi-
dence.125
118. 264 P.2d 461 (Or. 1953), affd on reh'g, 265 P.2d 251 (Or. 1954).
119. See id. at 462-63.
120. See id. at 463.
121. See id.
122. Id. at 465.
123. Jack v. Hunt, 265 P.2d 251,251 (Or. 1954).
124. Id.
125. I do not mean that the Oregon Supreme Court should necessarily have consid-
ered the information purportedly available through the view. The only indication of
what the trial judge saw may have been Ms. Jack's statements in the petition for rehear-
ing. In that case, the appellate court might have thought it inappropriate to consider
the information for that reason. However, there may well have been some better indi-
cation in the record that the trial judge had seen the roadway during the view. To say,
as a categorical matter, that because the information provided by a view is not evidence
it should not be considered is to muddle the two conceptions of evidence.
Some debate has arisen about whether a jury view provides "evidence." See,
e.g., MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 92, at 1196. The debate itself reflects con-
fusion about what we mean by legal evidence. This is because the standard argument
for calling a view evidence is that jurors will inevitably use any information obtained
from it that they deem relevant as bearing on disputed propositions. The argument as-
sumes that if jurors will consider information as bearing on a disputed proposition, then
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The muddling problem also appears when deciding whether a
reviewing court should consider nonevidence, as defined by the
four-sources conception, in assessing the potential prejudice asso-
ciated with trial error. The Supreme Court's decision in Darden v.
Wainwright,26 a death penalty case, provides an example. One of
the issues in Darden was whether a prosecutor's inflammatory
closing summation violated the defendant's right to due process.
The summation included concededly outrageous comments.1
Yet, Darden could only make out the due process violation if the
comments rendered the trial fundamentally unfair 129 and, on that
score, the relative strength of the government's case was crucial.
The Court noted that Darden took the stand on his own behalf.3 '
Indeed, Darden provided an alibi corroborated in part by several
of the state's witnesses .3 Yet, the Court rejected Darden's claim,
asserting that the "evidence" against him was "overwhelming."
As the dissent pointed out, the prosecutor's case was based largely
on the questionable eyewitness identification of Darden by two
strangers.'33 However, for present purposes the significant point is
that the majority failed to even mention that the trial judge made
statements on the record about Darden's demeanor while testify-
ig. The trial judge noted that Darden's demeanor strongly sug-
gested he was telling the truth when he denied being involved in
the crime and testified that he was in another location.'M Of
course, this was not evidence under the four-sources conception.
13
it is necessarily evidence. Yet, under the four-sources conception, this assumption is
incorrect; even nonevidence, such as the hypothesis offered in an attorney's argument,
may be considered as bearing on a disputed proposition. If the legitimacy of the trier's
consideration of information defined the boundaries of evidence, the word "evidence"
in the legal context would mean what it means in general parlance, and even attorney
arguments, for example, would be considered evidence.
126. 477 U.S. 168 (1986).
127. See id. at 170.
128. See id- at 179-80. "That argument deserves the condemnation it has received
from every court to review it." Id. at 179.
129. See id. at 181 (citing Donelly v. Dechristoford, 416 U.S. 637 (1974)).
130. See i&. at 182 (noting that the defense did not present a witness other than peti-
tioner).
131. See id at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
132. See id. at 182 (citing the trial court's decision).
133. See id. at 197-99 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
134. See id. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "The trial judge who had seen and
heard Darden testify found that he 'emotionally and with what appeared on its face to
be sincerity, proclaimed his innocence."' Ial (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
135. Sometimes demeanor information is said to have a limited evidentiary value as
"credibility evidence," but it does not classify as evidence under the terms of typical
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Yet, failure to consider it in deciding whether the prosecutor's
closing argument affected the outcome-as the majority's opinion
suggested it failed to do-was to commingle the four-sources con-
ception with the broader conception under which nonevidence is
not legitimately weighed.
136
Mixing of the two conceptions also occurs in claims question-
ing the propriety of a nonevidence instruction from the trial judge
as a remedy for a lawyer's erroneous summation. The problem is
the tendency of courts to rely on the standard instruction indicat-
ing that the arguments of counsel are not evidence as a cure for
improprieties in attorney arguments.137 When a lawyer only mis-
takenly recounts what one of the witnesses has asserted, the trial
judge appropriately advises jurors that the jurors' memories of the
testimony controls.13' However, while in practice in Washington,
D.C., I saw trial judges on several occasions decline to give more
than an instruction that "the arguments of counsel are not evi-
dence" to remedy a variety of improper arguments by prosecutors
such as inflammatory appeals to fear of crime, denigration of de-
fense counsel, and expressions of personal opinions on the credibil-
ity of witnesses. 139  Likewise, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals has frequently pointed to this standard instruction as a
cure for such improprieties.'4 Under the four-sources conception,
136. While the majority did not explicitly state that the trial court's statements were
entitled to no consideration, its opinion conveyed that message. If Darden came across
as credible, the case was only genuinely described as close because the government
bore a high burden of proof and its witnesses provided far from indisputable testimony
indicating Darden's guilt. Based in part on the statements by the trial judge regarding
Darden's demeanor as a witness, four members of the Court concluded that the prose-
cutor's improper summation could well have affected the jury's decision. See Darden,
477 U.S. at 189-97 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens,
JJ.).
137. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
139. I do not mean to suggest that only prosecutors made improper arguments, but I
point to such instances because only prosecutorial errors were typically the subject of
claims analyzed by the court of appeals.
140. See, eg., Hammill v. United States, 498 A.2d 551,558 (D.C. 1985) (rejecting the
defense's argument that the prosecutor violated due process in denigrating defense
counsel's calling of a child witness; in imputing to defense counsel a belief that an as-
pect of the defense was not worth arguing; and in injecting prosecutor's own opinions
on witness credibility because the trial court instructed the jury in its general charge
that the prosecution had carried the burden of proof and "counsel's arguments were
not evidence"); Fernandez v. United States, 375 A.2d 484, 486 (D.C. 1977) (rejecting a
claim based on a highly inflammatory argument by prosecutor regarding social ills
caused in the District of Columbia from crimes like the defendant's because "the
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an instruction that the argument of counsel is not evidence does
not mean that the argument of counsel should be ignored.' 41 Many
things are not evidence under the four-sources conception-
including counsel's argument-but the jury may still weigh them in
resolving a disputed proposition. On the other hand, for the Court
of Appeals to point to such an instruction as a remedy for im-
proper argument is to suggest that anything that is not called evi-
dence should not be considered, which accords with the meaning
of evidence under the inconsistent, broader conception. After evi-
dence is defined according to the four-sources conception, to ad-
vocate the notion that evidence means everything that is appropri-
ately considered is to transmogrify the two conceptions into an
insensible hybrid.'42
This last point also shows why the standard instructions im-
plementing the four-sources conception confuse jurors. The de-
lineation of "what is" from "what is not" evidence in these in-
structions does not aim to separate what jurors can consider.'43
Jurors are supposed to consider, for example, the background
knowledge that they bring to the trial and the lawyers' opening
statements and summations although this information is not evi-
dence under jury instructions. Lay jurors attempting to follow the
instructions may not understand that some nonevidence can be
weighed along with evidence. Some jurors might well conclude,
based on the meaning of evidence in normal parlance and the
seemingly contradictory nature of some of the instructions,'" that
only evidence as defined by the instructions should be considered
or, in any event, given significant weight. This confuses the two
court's instruction in its final charge to the jury that argument of counsel was not evi-
dence came immediately after the summation, and hence provided an antidote to its
inflammatory character") (emphasis in original); see also Darden, 477 U.S. at 182
(rejecting challenge to outrageously inflammatory summation by prosecutor, in part,
because "[t]he trial court instructed the jurors several times that their decision was to be
made on the basis of the evidence alone, and that the arguments of counsel were not
evidence").
141. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (discussing pattern instructions
similar to those employed in the District of Columbia).
142. A view that the instruction conveys to the jury that it should not give any
weight to the closing arguments also raises constitutional questions. The Sixth
Amendment guarantees the right to have the trier free to consider one's summation in
both jury and nonjury trials. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975); Thomas v.
United States, 473 A.2d 378 (App. D.C. 1984).
143. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
144. As for the apparent contradiction in some pattern instructions, see supra notes
86-90 and accompanying text.
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conceptions of evidence and is not what those instructions are in-
tended to accomplish. Yet, if appellate courts assert that jury in-
structions mean that even attorney arguments should be disre-
garded, we should not wonder that jurors arrive at the same
interpretation.
This pervasive confusion of the two conceptions also compli-
cates efforts to discuss the proof process. An important article by
Professor Ronald Allen, entitled Factual Ambiguity and a Theory
of Evidence,1 4 underscores this problem. In the article Professor
Allen notes that the "conventional [four-source] theory of... evi-
dence"'' fails to account for several kinds of evidence.1 47 As ex-
amples, he points to the demeanor of witnesses, rules of deduction,
and the knowledge and intelligence a fact finder must employ to
convert into propositions what is admitted into evidence.1'4 On the
view that a "theory of... evidence should allow us to speak fully
about how triers find facts," Professor Allen argues that evidence
must "reduce[] to the proposition that a disinterested fact finder
reconstructs the past based on all the observational inputs avail-
able at the moment of judging. '1 49
Professor Allen uses the term "evidence" to connote two dif-
ferent concepts. This is proper because lawyers use evidence to
convey these two inconsistent ideas. Lawyers use evidence to sig-
nify under the four-sources conception what we recognize to be a
limited part of the input upon which the fact finder relies. We also
sometimes think of evidence as embodying all of the input that the
fact finder considers. Nonetheless, this usage will appear odd to
the reader who fails to recognize that evidence has dual meanings,
and because we frequently combine the two conceptions into an
insensible hybrid, we can easily overlook their separate identities.
My second and more fundamental point is that Professor Al-
len's conclusion warrants debate. By the term "evidence," he
concludes, we should refer to the all-encompassing conception of
evidence rather than to the restrictive, four-sources conception. In
confronting our confusion about what we mean by evidence, the
very question to explore is how we should conceptualize evidence.
Of course, abandoning one or the other conception would avoid
145. See Allen, supra note 101.
146. Id. at 616.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 616-17.
149. Id. at 627-28.
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intermingling them into a nonsensical hybrid. Which conception,
if either, should go? We now turn to that question.
V. CONFRONTING THE INTERMINGLING PROBLEM
No easy remedy exists for the confusion about the nature of
legal evidence. Assuming we could suddenly transform legal dia-
logue, we would do better choosing the broad conception of evi-
dence over the restrictive conception. However, a sudden trans-
formation of our dialogue is unlikely, and even a gradual
movement towards a unitary conception is implausible. Based on
this view, we can only avoid confusion by recognizing the dual
conceptions and by striving to avoid such intermingling.
If we could transform legal discourse, the broad conception of
legal evidence would appear more attractive than the four-sources
conception because the broad conception corresponds with the
meaning of evidence in general parlance. The discussion in Part
IV implied that the broad conception of legal evidence interferes
with the dominant four-sources conception. 0 Yet, this restrictive
notion itself is the problem. After all, it is strange to conclude that
a trier can rationally find facts not revealed by evidence. How-
ever, that result occurs under the four-sources view of evidence.51
This is odd because our expectation is that evidence should en-
compass all of the legitimate informational input for reaching a
factual finding.
One might argue that the broad notion of legal evidence,
rather than the four-sources conception, would better serve us for
reasons beyond its mere alignment with our sense of what evi-
dence means from a nonlegal context. For example, defining evi-
dence to include all of the legitimate operational input affecting
the fact finder could also underscore the importance of the overall
process, causing us to expand our focus in law school teaching.
Likewise, opting for the all-encompassing view of evidence might
be thought to enhance our ability to understand and carry on dia-
logue about that broader proof process. Further, one might con-
tend that viewing evidence broadly could stimulate valuable re-
form in the way that trial courts instruct jurors. Instead of limiting
150. See supra Part IV.
151. See supra text accompanying note 15 (discussing Dixon case and noting that,
while the Dixon jurors were authorized to acquit merely on finding that the govern-
ment had not met its heavy burden of proof, they actually found the facts to have been
as the defense had hypothesized).
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the juror's consideration to only certain sources, the trial judge
might simply warn jurors against considering particular informa-
tion that the court deems inappropriate. This approach would
avoid conveying a definition of evidence that misleads jurors about
what they may consider.52
On inspection, these additional arguments for the broad con-
ception carry marginal, if any, force. The argument that the broad
conception of evidence could encourage expanded law school
teaching about proving facts essentially harkens back to the
greater potential for confusion posed by the four-sources concep-
tion. As long as we remember that the four-sources conception of
evidence does not encompass important informational input in fact
finding, adhering to that conception does not obscure the impor-
tance of the larger proof process. Similarly, the value of the broad
view to discussions of the proof or fact finding process is lost if
other terms allow us to easily reference the larger process. As this
discussion itself underscores, appropriate terms exist: "proof from
the perspective of the lawyer and "fact finding" from the perspec-
tive of the trier.153 Finally, the notion that courts should simply
avoid defining evidence when instructing jurors, and instead de-
scribe things they want jurors to ignore, also does not require
abandoning the four-sources conception of evidence. As long as
we remember the four-sources conception does not equate with
the boundaries of legitimate proof, there is no impediment to pro-
ceeding in that manner. 54
We should also concede that abandoning the four-sources
view of evidence in favor of the more all-encompassing conception
would involve some opportunity costs. The distinctions drawn by
the four-sources conception are not worthless. Evidence, as con-
ceived by the restrictive view, delineates the central fund of new
data that the fact finder processes. It does not encompass all of the
data or even all of the new data upon which the fact finder legiti-
152. See supra text accompanying note 144.
153. See, e.g., WIGMORE, supra note 79, at 2-3 (describing the larger process, from
the lawyer's perspective, as one of "proof"); Twining, supra note 105, at 25 (using the
terms "Evidence, Proof and Factfinding" to describe a course embodying rules of
evidence but also the larger process).
154. Proceeding in this way, however, would raise new dilemmas. To describe
only a few things to be ignored would abrogate the effort to provide accurate guid-
ance to jurors about what they should and should not consider. To describe all of the
information that might be available to jurors but that the court would want them to
ignore, however, involves extensive and highly complex directives.
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mately relies. For example, it does not encompass attorney argu-
ments although the arguments may provide new data in the form
of hypotheses, inferences, and analogies influencing the trier's
findings.55 Still, the distinction, subscribed to by scholars like
Thayer and Wigmore, has come to have some shorthand, expres-
sive value.
These points lead back to the contention that we should favor
a broad conception of legal evidence simply because, over the long
run, we would more likely adhere to it than to the four-sources
conception. The advantage of the broad conception is that it con-
forms to our sense of what evidence means in nonlegal discourse.
The disadvantage of the four-sources conception is that it departs
from that broad conception and does so to express an idea that is
not very important, making it difficult to maintain as a distinct
idea. Hence, if we could start afresh, we should view evidence as
signifying all of the informational input that legitimately influence
the fact finder at the moment of decision.
We should also concede, however, that conceiving of evidence
as coterminous with legitimate proof-the broad conception-
implicates serious potential for confusion. The difficulty is that
there are multiple reference points for determining what is legiti-
mate proof and no single answer as to which reference point
should be employed. Who should decide what influences are
"legitimate?" As between a court and jurors, it might initially ap-
pear that the court should decide. This accords with having the
judge initially filter the information to which we expose jurors and
then give limiting instructions regarding how jurors should employ
the information they possess. However, even as between a court
and jurors, the problem becomes more complicated once we real-
ize that a trial judge cannot limit jurors' exposure to influences
deemed legitimate by the courts nor give precise instructions about
what information in the jurors' possession they may consider. We
must also recognize that jurors do not have to follow the limiting
instructions they are given. The question, therefore, remains
whether evidence should include all of the influences jurors con-
155. See Levin & Levy, supra note 22, at 139 (discussing limits on the introduction of
new facts and ideas in attorney summation); supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
Relegating attorney arguments to the less important status of nonevidence also
conveys positivist assumptions, not entirely satisfying, about a shared, normative ability
to come to particular factual conclusions about the past based merely on the data en-
compassed by the four-sources conception. See WIGMORE, supra note 66, at 6-7 & n.3
(editorial comments of Professor Peter Tillers).
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elude are relevant or only those influences the court deems legiti-
mate. To conclude that evidence encompasses everything that
might influence the jurors is to ignore the court's effort to limit
what the jurors consider. To conclude that evidence encompasses
only what the trial judge deems appropriately considered, how-
ever, is to ignore the actual process through which jurors find
facts. 56
The problem with attempting to identify a single perspective
for determining legitimacy is that we can beneficially see evidence
from multiple perspectives depending on the question we seek to
answer. If we want a theory of evidence that corresponds to a
jury's fact finding process at trial, we must understand evidence as
encompassing all of the input that influences the jury's decision.
If we want a theory of evidence that describes appellate review as
we currently have it, evidence must be perceived from the per-
spective of the courts; a court's view of what is legitimately
weighed will frequently differ from that of the jury.5 If we want
156. Consider the psychological impact on a jury of the order in which witnesses tes-
tify or the demeanor and appearance of the attorneys during the proceedings. These
factors may well affect a juror's ultimate view of the facts. The Supreme Court has
even guaranteed that criminal defendants will maintain limited control over the order
in which defense witnesses will appear and over whom to retain as defense counsel.
Regarding the defendant's right to control the order in which defense witnesses testify,
see Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), and Professor Peter Westen's incisive
comments on the case in Order of Proof: An Accused's Right to Control the Timing and
Sequence of Evidence in His Defense, 66 CAL. L. REv. 935, 975-79 (1978). As for the
defendant's limited right to retain counsel of his choice, see generally WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 547-51 (2d ed. 1992).
Do these variables constitute evidence under the broad conception? If evi-
dence is viewed as the process by which the jurors reach a factual decision, including all
of the operational input that affects the conclusion, these factors may qualify from the
perspective of some jurors. However, from the perspective of a court reviewing a case
to determine, for example, whether an alleged error was rendered inconsequential by
the evidence, these surely will not be deemed legitimate factors. A reviewing court
would be unlikely to absorb these influences if it only perused a cold record and, in any
event, could not readily determine their effects on particular jurors. Furthermore, even
if those effects could be determined, the reviewing court might hold a different view of
their value than particular jurors and, further, might believe that its own assessment
should control. Thus, the problem: The broad conception of evidence means different
things depending on who is deemed the fact finder or on whose perspective we rely to
determine legitimacy.
157. See Allen, supra note 101, at 627-28.
158. For a variety of reasons, a court may view what is appropriately considered
proof differently than a jury, particularly if the proof is to be articulated in a written
opinion. For example, an appellate court might concede that jurors are unavoidably
influenced by the order of defense witnesses or by the demeanor of the lawyers but
have a different view of whether those factors should be considered as information
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to speak about evidence from the perspective of an outside ob-
server deciding whether the jury's verdict reflects a factually accu-
rate decision, we must take into account all that the observer con-
siders in deciding what occurred. This would include, for example,
information that was suppressed by the trial court under the
Fourth Amendment but was revealed to the observer during a pre-
trial hearing. All of these views of evidence sensibly coexist.
The potential for confusion about what constitutes evidence
under the broad conception, however, does not change my con-
clusion that the broad conception would be preferable to the four-
sources conception if we were in a position to choose.'59 The po-
tential for confusion arising under the broad conception arises un-
der any conception of evidence. That potential for confusion
arises from ambiguity about the perspective from which we are to
decide what is legitimate proof. That kind of confusion arises, for
example, when we doubt that a jury should consider the persuasive
demeanor of a lawyer in closing argument simply because an ap-
pellate court reviewing a sufficiency claim would not consider the
lawyer's demeanor. That sort of confusion would plague us even if
we consistently followed the four-sources conception of evidence
because we would still often need to resolve what constitutes le-
gitimate proof vis a vis various fact finders. The potential for con-
fusion associated with the four-sources conception stems from its
mere existence and only adds to the potential for confusion over
what is legitimate proof. The four-sources conception does not
express what should govern a jury, an appellate court, or any other
observer in deciding upon the facts in a case. It represents a sepa-
rate notion of evidence under which evidence does not include all
that is appropriately considered. The very problem it poses, how-
supporting a particular factual view for purposes of resolving certain questions pre-
sented to it on appeal. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. For an explanation
of this difference in views, see Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial
Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1357, 1363 (1985)
(contending that courts aim to promote public acceptance of verdicts as statements
about a past event while juries may sometimes only view their decisions as probabilistic
statements based on the information available to them).
159. One searching for an ultimate definition of legal evidence that can help resolve
what information is appropriately weighed in a particular case would find the definition
I advocate here disappointing. The proposed conception does not purport to answer
such questions and, indeed, on that score appears circular. However, I believe a brief
definition of legal evidence in this more ambitious sense will always remain elusive.
Even if we could decide on a single correct perspective from which to define evidence,
what we would view as evidence would depend on many factors and our views about
those various factors would change over time.
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ever, is that we sometimes unthinkingly mix it with the broader
conception. Hence, by simply abandoning the four-sources con-
ception, we would eliminate that potential problem.
In the end, however, the solution to our confusion lies more
with efforts to achieve clarity in thinking and expression than with
efforts to produce a transformation to a unitary conception of evi-
dence. Although the restrictive conception adds little to our dis-
course and poses much potential for confusion, it has become our
dominant definition of evidence. Hence, a transformation, even in
the long run, to a broad conception of evidence is unrealistic. The
restrictive conception has achieved too much momentum in our
thinking about evidence for us to abandon it now.'
1°
Despite our inability to abandon the four-sources conception,
the confusion attributable to maintaining it is not inescapable. The
principle problem lies in our failure to recognize that the four-
sources view and the all-encompassing view are distinct concep-
tions. They embody fundamentally different ideas about the na-
ture of evidence. Simply understanding that we hold dual concep-
tions and that we have often conflated them can help us avoid
confusing them in the future.
VI. THE IMPLICATIONS OF RECOGNIZING THE DUAL CONCEPTIONS
Maintaining our separate dual conceptions of evidence has
significant consequences for how we understand the proof process.
The effort to keep the views separate will not produce facile rules
regarding what information a legal fact finder may legitimately
consider. Nonetheless, avoiding a confusion of our dual concep-
tions eliminates a major impediment to clear consideration of such
questions. Once we recognize that the four-sources conception of
evidence does not trace the boundaries of legitimate proof, we are
forced to recognize that fact finders appropriately consider infor-
mation outside the four-sources conception. We must then di-
rectly confront questions about what information the fact finder
should weigh.
While we must reorient our discussions about proof, we need
not alter all of our current discourse about evidence. Many inquir-
160. Moreover, the multiple dimensions for understanding evidence under the broad
conception would make it important to accept its plural nature and the need for care in
thought and expression about it even if we abandoned the four-sources conception.
Maintaining the four-sources conception only augments a potential for confusion that
already exists.
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ies related to evidence only concern what testimony litigants
should be able to reveal to a trial fact finder. The confusion on
which this Article focuses does not call for changes in our ap-
proach to those problems. 1' The problems with which I am con-
cerned arise when the discussion implicates the meaning of
"evidence." We confuse two inconsistent views of evidence by
suggesting that only a few sources provide evidence while simulta-
neously concluding that only evidence can legitimately influence
fact finders. 2
Recognizing the dual conceptions has important prescriptive
implications in a variety of contexts. Evidence teachers, for ex-
ample, should attempt to reinforce that what we call evidence un-
der the four-sources conception embodies only a fraction of the in-
formation and influences that legitimately cause a trial fact finder
to reach particular factual conclusions.1 6 Lawyers win cases not
simply through their influence on the testimonial data but through
their influence on jury selection, their influence on the demeanor
of persons before the jury, their presentation order, and their
opening statements, questions, and summations. These points can
be conveyed through nonstandard approaches such as teaching the
rules of testimonial admissibility as part of a much larger course or
series of courses that embody a study of trial advocacy and of the
processes by which fact finders reach conclusions.' 64 Moreover, if
the traditional course focusing on admissibility rules is followed,
the instructor should at least underscore the limited role of testi-
monial data compared to the lawyer's persuasive efforts.
Courts confronting alleged trial errors should not confuse evi-
dence as defined under the four-sources conception with the
boundaries of legitimate proof. 65 For example, when a lawyer
161. This is true, at least, if we recognize that the personal perspective of the ob-
server has quite a lot to do with relevance determinations. It is important that lawyers
and judges be sensitive to the existence of varying perspectives in addressing these
problems.
162. This notion misleads young lawyers about the proof process, results in confus-
ing instructions to jurors about the sources of information that they may consider, dis-
torts judicial thinking about the legitimate influences on fact finding, and undermines
efforts at discourse about fact finding. See supra Part IV.
163. We should also reconsider how we might teach more systematically about the
broader proof process. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
165. For a reviewing court to ask whether a verdict appears rational from the per-
spective of the trial fact finder is essentially to give up the task of reviewing the rational-
ity of verdicts. Reviewing courts will pursue a sense of what is appropriate proof in a
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makes an inflammatory argument in closing summation, courts
should not conclude that the error is remedied by an instruction
that the summation is "not evidence." The trial judge can only ap-
propriately attempt to remedy the improper argument with an in-
struction to disregard statements that focus specifically and force-
fully on the improper argument.
In deciding whether a jury's verdict was rational or whether an
alleged error was harmless, reviewing courts also should not con-
fuse evidence as defined under the four-sources conception with
the boundaries of legitimate proof. If the record reveals informa-
tion conveyed to the trier through a view of an event scene, for ex-
ample, an appellate court reviewing the rationality of a verdict
should not ignore that information merely because it is not evi-
dence under the four-sources conception. The same could be
said for information revealed in the trial record, for example, con-
cerning the demeanor of witnesses or a party and, certainly, con-
cerning the attorneys' closing arguments. My purpose in this Ar-
ticle is not to delineate the boundaries of legitimate proof. 67 My
purpose is to underscore that we must actually confront these
questions. In reaching their factual findings, do jurors legitimately
rely on the demeanor of a party sitting at counsel table? Are ju-
rors legitimately influenced by the order in which the lawyers call
witnesses? Do jurors in a criminal case appropriately rely on their
own sense that police officers are prone, when necessary, to testify
falsely? Should an appellate court ignore these factors in drawing
factual conclusions even if it thinks the jury was appropriately in-
fluenced by them? These are questions not appropriately an-
swered merely by determining whether the influences involved
constitute evidence under the four-sources conception.
Courts should also reconsider whether jury instructions de-
scribing evidence in accordance with the four-sources conception
are preferable to simply telling jurors to avoid considering certain
information and to consider other information in only limited
case that differs from that pursued by the trial fact finder. See supra text accompanying
note 158. Nonetheless, where information is available to the appellate judges that sup-
ports a verdict but that does not qualify as evidence under the four-sources conception,
the appellate court should not automatically exclude that information from its consid-
eration. See supra text accompanying notes 111-25 (discussing cases in which demeanor
information and view information was revealed to reviewing judges).
166. See, eg., supra text accompanying notes 118-25.
167. The boundaries of legitimate proof should be different depending on who is
serving as the fact finder and the nature of the decision to be made. See supra notes
156-58 and accompanying text.
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ways. This latter approach to jury instructions raises certain di-
lemmas about how much to tell jurors regarding improper consid-
erations. Nonetheless, I believe it would be better, and certainly
no worse, than the approach we now typically follow. Our typical,
current jury instructions regarding the nature and function of evi-
dence are hopelessly contradictory.169
VII. CONCLUSION
Lawyers often mishandle problems that implicate the meaning
of evidence. The problem arises because we hold dual conceptions
of evidence. On the one hand, we are dominated by a restrictive,
four-sources conception under which only a few designated
sources provide evidence but under which we recognize that the
fact finder also relies heavily on nonevidence to find facts. On the
other hand, we are influenced by the notion followed in general
parlance that evidence embodies all of the legitimate input that
produces a factual conclusion. The problems result when we con-
fuse these two separate conceptions into an illogical hybrid. We
think of the four-sources conception as specifying what qualifies as
evidence. Yet, based on our conception of evidence from nonlegal
discourse, we conclude that the evidence embodies all that prop-
erly influences the fact finder. The four-sources conception comes
to signify, erroneously, the boundaries of what we view as legiti-
mate proof.
If we could choose between the two views, we would best
abandon the four-sources notion in favor of the more all-
encompassing conception. The basis for this conclusion is simply
that the four-sources conception embodies a view that is difficult
to maintain consistently because it departs from our sense of what
evidence means in ordinary discourse, and it does so to represent
an idea of little value. Hence, assuming it were possible to trans-
form legal discourse, we could more easily find conceptual unity
behind the all-encompassing notion of evidence than the four-
sources conception.
The solution to our confusion over the meaning of evidence,
168. To describe only a few things to be ignored would abrogate the effort to pro-
vide accurate guidance to jurors about what they should and should not consider. To
describe all of the information that might be available to jurors but that the court would
want them to ignore, however, involves extensive and highly complex directives.
169. For the approach that we now typically follow, see supra notes 86-89 and ac-
companying text.
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however, lies more with efforts to achieve clarity in thinking and
expression than with a transformation to a unitary conception.
Movement toward the broad conception of legal evidence is un-
likely. Appreciating that we currently hold dual conceptions of
evidence and recognizing how we have often conflated them is the
most important step that we can take to avoid confusing them in
the future.
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